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INTRODUCTION: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A WHOLLY
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONSTITUTION
RITICS of Marbury v. Madison have long complained thatC judicial review frustrates majoritarian democracy.2 In addition,
critics sometimes complain that the Constitution's text does not en-
tail judicial review of federal legislation.' In Marbury, Chief Justice
John Marshall invokes the judicial oath of office in support of judi-
cial review,4 but the oath does not distinguish judges from other
public officials who also swear fealty to the Constitution. Nor do
Marshall's other arguments, such as the possibility of clear consti-
tutional violation by the legislature,5 justify privileging judicial in-
terpretation. The opinion, for all its majesty, never squarely ad-
dresses the fundamental question of whose interpretation of the
Constitution should prevail in cases of conflict.6 Both sorts of criti-
cism-that a sound democratic constitution should not establish
'5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).2 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics 16-23 (2d ed. 1986); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 155-56 (1893).
'The canonical statement of the point is found in William W. Van Alstyne, A Criti-
cal Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 22 (1969) ("It is clear... that the
supremacy clause itself cannot be the clear textual basis for a claim by the judiciary
that this prerogative to determine repugnancy belongs to it.").
4 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
See id. at 179.
6 Marshall's best textual argument relies on the assignment to the judiciary, in Arti-
cle III, of the power to hear "all Cases... arising under this Constitution." See U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. Marshall declares the proposi-
tion that the courts might adjudicate a case arising under the Constitution without
providing their own interpretation of the Constitution "too extravagant to be main-
tained." Id. at 179. The point is a fair one, although one could certainly imagine that
the federal courts might apply their own interpretation of the Constitution only as
against contrary state interpretations, not contrary interpretations by Congress. Inter-
estingly, one of the best arguments in the literature for finding a power of judicial re-
view in the Constitution's text and structure relies on the role of the Supreme Court
vis-A-vis state courts. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1959) (arguing that the obligation of state courts
to give effect to the Constitution per the Supremacy Clause entails a parallel obliga-
tion for the Supreme Court on appeal).
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judicial review and that the American Constitution is best read not
to establish judicial review-can lead ultimately to calls for the
complete abolition of judicial review, for "[t]aking the Constitution
[a]way from the [c]ourts."7
Ingredient in most forms of judicial review skepticism is the im-
plicit claim that it would be possible for courts to accept the word
of Congress as final on matters of constitutional interpretation.
Once one acknowledges that courts have the duty to apply statutes
and other nonconstitutional sources of law, however, it becomes
difficult to understand how they could not exercise at least some
version of the Marbury power. In short, it may be impossible to
take the entire Constitution away from the courts.
If the calls for abolishing judicial review (either by constitutional
amendment or by overruling Marbury) were heeded, federal courts
would find themselves in a vexing position, as a schematic example
illustrates. Suppose plaintiff Smith appears before federal judge
Jones waving a piece of paper that appears to be a federal statute
entitling Smith to a judgment against defendant Acme Manufactur-
ing for Acme's alleged violation of Smith's rights as set forth in the
purported federal statute. Before the judge can apply the statute
she must be sure that the piece of paper in fact is a statute.
Suppose that, contra Marbury, the judge accepts the authorita-
tive utterances of Congress as binding on matters of constitutional
interpretation. Accordingly, Smith claims that the piece of paper
granting him rights against Acme is an authoritative utterance of
Congress. The judge cannot simply take Smith's word for it; she
must ask whether Congress actually enacted the purported statute.
Identifying authoritative utterances of Congress involves a two-
step process. First, the judge must identify Congress.8 Second, she
must identify its authoritative utterances. The Constitution speaks
to both steps. Congress is the body chosen by the process set forth
'Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); see also
Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 56-77 (1958) (examining arguments for and against
judicial review); Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 255-312 (1999) (arguing
that popular demand for constitutional rights does not eliminate the countermajori-
tarian difficulty of judicial review).
'The Court must also identify the President-even if one thinks the Court should
not choose the President. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ending the Florida re-
count and effectively selecting Bush as President). See infra text accompanying note
64.
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in Article I, Sections 2 through 4 and the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, rather than, say, a group of self-styled patriots meeting on a
Washington, D.C. tennis court. And Congress's authoritative ut-
terances are those that (at a minimum) satisfy the criteria for law-
making set forth in Section 7 of Article I With respect to the piece
of paper that purports to grant Smith rights against Acme, the
judge must ask whether the body designated as Congress by the
Constitution enacted it in accordance with the procedures set forth
in the Constitution." In other words, even in a world in which judi-
cial review were formally abolished, the courts would still be
guided by their own, independent interpretation of the Constitu-
tion in identifying the authoritative utterances of Congress.
The hypothetical case of the putative statute is more than a mere
curiosity. It reveals that the conception of judicial interpretation of
the Constitution held by judicial review critics, as well as most
judges, lawyers, and scholars, is too narrow. In the standard ac-
count, judicial review is a process in which courts decline to en-
force acts of Congress or state laws when they run afoul of consti-
tutional prohibitions. The Constitution, on this view, consists of a
list of what we will call "application conditions" for legal norms.
The power to interpret the Constitution is, in this standard ac-
count, the power to set aside a law in favor of a constitutional pro-
vision that overrides it.
Yet, much of the Constitution consists of what are more prop-
erly understood as what we will call "existence conditions"-for in-
stance, the President is the person chosen by the process set forth
in Article II and the Twelfth Amendment; a bill becomes a law
upon passage by both houses of Congress and signature of the
'We say "at a minimum" because-as shall be argued at length below-
constitutional provisions other than Article I, § 7 may also state existence conditions
for federal statutes.
,0 Could the judicial review skeptic reply that courts need not identify Congress and
its authoritative utterances, but can instead defer to any body claiming to be Congress
as to whether it really is Congress and whether its directives really are statutes? This
clearly is not a viable reply. First, multiple, competing bodies might claim to be Con-
gress. A court in this situation could not decide the existence questions at hand-what
body is Congress and which directives are statutes-by deferring to the self-styled
Congress, because there would be multiple such claimants providing conflicting an-
swers to these questions. Second, and more fundamentally, we fail to see what
grounds-epistemic or otherwise-could possibly justify a judicial practice of defer-
ring to any body claiming to be Congress as to what Congress and statutes really are.
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President;" and treaties are effective upon ratification by a two-
thirds vote in the Senate.12 In order to apply ordinary, nonconstitu-
tional law, courts must first identify the law.'3 They cannot com-
pletely avoid doing so by deferring to Congress, since to defer to
Congress is just to identify one kind of nonconstitutional law-a
statute.
This Article will employ the distinction between application and
existence conditions to clarify what is at stake in calls either to
make the Constitution nonjusticiable or for courts to defer to other
actors' interpretations of the Constitution, and to shed light on the
role that various doctrines of judicial deference play in our consti-
tutional culture. If a constitutional provision states an application
condition, to say that the provision should be nonjusticiable is not
especially problematic. Under Marbury, the courts possess the
power to enforce application conditions, but we can readily imag-
ine a world in which they do not. In such a world, a court would
apply any duly enacted law, notwithstanding the fact that, accord-
ing to its own best interpretation of the Constitution, the law runs
afoul of a constitutional provision. In the counter-Marbury world,
application conditions are not addressed to the courts, and so their
interpretation of such conditions is simply irrelevant to adjudica-
tion.
If a constitutional provision states an existence condition, how-
ever, rendering that provision nonjusticiable raises conceptual dif-
ficulties. For in such circumstances a court's reading of the Consti-
tution may entail that the putative law put before it is not a law at
all. A court cannot know what law to apply without first interpret-
ing the Constitution.
We do not, of course, contend that overturning or narrowing
Marbury would make the Constitution disappear in a puff of logic.
"U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
12 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
"The jurisprudential literature sometimes uses the term "legal validity" equiva-
lently to this Article's term "existence condition." See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Con-
cept of Law 107 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that the rule of recognition "provides criteria
for the assessment of the validity of other rules; but it is also unlike [other rules] in
that there is no rule providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity");
Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1302,
1303 (1991) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) and
defining legal validity as the "criteria [a] putative law must satisfy to be valid").
2003] 1109
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Many of the Constitution's provisions may be read as stating appli-
cation rather than existence conditions." Moreover, it is possible
for a court to defer to other actors even as to existence conditions.
For example, federal courts accept the decisions of state courts or
Congress as to which of two rival factions is the legitimate govern-
ment of a state. 5 And state courts and lower federal courts accept
the word of the United States Supreme Court as to the content of
constitutional doctrine. But such decisions to defer to other actors
with respect to existence conditions either should be based on the
courts' readings of the Constitution itself, as is sometimes true
when a court concludes that a case presents a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question, 6 or should be made on epistemic grounds-where the
court concludes that some other actor has greater expertise with
respect to the constitutional issue at hand.'7 In either case, the deci-
sion to defer will itself need to be validated by constitutional crite-
ria: In the foregoing examples, the state courts, Congress, and the
Supreme Court would need to be identified according to the crite-
ria set forth in the Constitution'" to distinguish them from impos-
tors.
Evaluating calls to make all or part of the Constitution nonjusti-
ciable as well as calls for judicial deference to elected officials (or
" See infra Part II.
15 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (finding that federal courts lack
the authority to adjudicate between two opposing factions, each of which claims to
constitute the legitimate government of a state); id. at 40 ("Upon such a question the
courts of the United States are bound to follow the decisions of the State tribu-
nals... ."); id. at 42 ("Under [the Guaranty Clause] it rests with Congress to decide
what government is the established one in a State.").
16 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) ("We hold that the claim pleaded
here neither rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is
therefore not foreclosed by our decisions of cases involving that clause."); Luther, 48
U.S. (7 How.) at 42 (finding a claim based on the Guaranty Clause to be nonjusticia-
ble); id. at 217 ("Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found [inter alia] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department .... ").
17 One thinks of the general argument for following rules and obeying authority. See
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 233-49 (1979); Fre-
derick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991).
8 For provisions identifying the Supreme Court, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Id.
art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court .... "). For discussion of provisions identifying state courts and Congress, see
infra Section II.A.
[Vol. 89:11051110
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others) in matters of constitutional interpretation would therefore
appear to require some assessment of which provisions of the Con-
stitution state existence conditions and which state application
conditions. As we will argue below, much of the Constitution is
best read as stating existence conditions.
Consider a separation-of-powers case like Clinton v. City of New
York.'9 At issue there (according to the majority) was whether
Congress could grant the President the equivalent of a line-item
veto." The Court said no. As in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated
the legislative veto,2 in Clinton the Court held that, absent a per-
missible delegation of power, utterances of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive that did not precisely follow the terms of Article I, Section
7 lacked legal effect.22
Would overruling Marbury undercut Chadha and Clinton? It
might. In each instance it is possible to treat the legislation author-
izing the unorthodox lawmaking procedure as dispositive of the
constitutional question. 3 Even if the line-item veto and legislative
veto do not appear to comport with Article I, Section 7, the stat-
utes conferring these powers were enacted in conformity therewith,
and those statutes can be given deference-either because the
courts read the relevant constitutional provisions as making Con-
gress authoritative with respect to them or because of a policy of
deference on epistemic grounds.
But granting Congress deference will not always be a coherent
solution to challenges to novel lawmaking procedures. Imagine, for
example, a law enacted in conformity with Section 7 of Article I
that purports to require a three-fifths majority in each house for all
subsequent measures raising taxes and that further declares itself
amendable only by a three-fifths majority in each house. Even in
the counter-Marbury world, it seems clear that a federal court
would have to engage in nondeferential constitutional reasoning in
order to determine whether to treat this law as binding in the face
9 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
20 Id. at 447-48.
21462 U.S. 919 (1983).
22 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-41.
2 Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 980 (White, J., dissenting) ("The power to exercise a legis-
lative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral approval or Presiden-
tial consideration. The veto must be authorized by statute and may only negative
what an Executive department or independent agency has proposed.").
2003] 1111
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of a subsequent measure-enacted by simple majorities of both
houses of Congress, signed by the President, and thus appearing to
be an authoritative utterance of Congress-purporting to repeal it.
The principle of deference to the authoritative utterances of Con-
gress would still require the Court to decide the conditions, if any,
under which one Congress can bind a subsequent one. Given that
requirement, how much of a step do the rulings in Chadha and
Clinton represent?
Cases like Chadha and Clinton are sometimes described as pos-
ing separation-of-powers issues, yet the Constitution contains no
specifically-articulated separation-of-powers principle.24 Separa-
tion-of-powers cases arise when one or more government actors at-
tempt to exercise powers that, it is argued, the Constitution lodges
elsewhere. One can describe such cases as posing the question
whether the courts will apply the allegedly unconstitutional legal
norm, but it is no less plausible to see them as posing existence
questions: Has a constitutionally empowered actor acted in a way
that gives rise to binding legal norms in the first place?
If we view the Constitution's provisions governing the allocation
of lawmaking authority as setting forth existence conditions, it is
not at all clear why we should not regard many other provisions in
the same way. Of course, the question posed by a case like United
States v. Lopez25 could be described as whether the courts are re-
quired to apply the Gun Free School Zones Act. But Lopez might
also be described as posing the question whether the Gun Free
School Zones Act is an authoritative utterance of Congress or
whether it is, in the language of the previous paragraph, an attempt
by one actor-the federal government-to exercise a power that
the Constitution allocates to the states.
Indeed, all constitutional provisions might be understood as set-
ting forth existence conditions. Certainly that was the dominant
understanding for much of American constitutional history. Ex-
pressing what had long been the canonical view, the Supreme
Court stated in Norton v. Shelby County that "[a]n unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
24 Some state constitutions do. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. 1II, § 43; Ill. Const. art. 2,
§ I; Mich. Const. art. III, § 2; S.C. Const. art. I, § 8.
5 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed."26 Even the word-
ing of some constitutional rights provisions, such as the First
Amendment-instructing Congress as to what laws it can and can-
not make-suggests that rights are not, or certainly are not merely,
shields or trumps that block otherwise lawful measures; they can
also be understood as setting forth existence conditions for legisla-
tion.
We do not mean to suggest that it would be logically impossible
for courts to treat rights provisions, federalism provisions, and even
most separation-of-powers provisions as setting forth application
rather than existence conditions. Our point is simply that the con-
stitutional text does not itself expressly draw any such line. Nothing
in the written Constitution suggests that the lawmaking conditions
set forth in Section 7 of Article I are to be treated differently from
the powers enumerated in Section 8 of Article I. As far as the text
of the Constitution is concerned, each of these provisions appears
to say what pronouncements, by whom, count as law.27 Given the
wording of our Constitution, judicial power to "enforce" the Con-
stitution in the limited sense of identifying the authoritative pro-
nouncements by Congress that are to receive deference may be the
proverbial camel's nose under the tent, opening a path to full-
26 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
27 Most notably, the text of the Supremacy Clause draws no distinction between ex-
istence and application conditions with regard to nonconstitutional federal law, but
rather suggests that all constitutional provisions fall into the first category-that a
federal "law" which fails to be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution is no law at
all and is therefore not binding on state actors. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Consti-
tution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."). The Clause's reference to state judges makes clear that they, along
with federal actors, are bound by federal law. The Clause takes for granted that fed-
eral actors, including federal judges, are bound by the Constitution, and thus sug-
gests-if we are to extrapolate from the Supremacy Clause in this way-that they are
obliged to treat all constitutional conditions applicable to federal law as existence
conditions. To be clear, however, we do not defend the proposition that every consti-
tutional condition applicable to federal law is an existence condition. As indicated be-
low, for example, the Takings Clause is probably best read as an application condi-
tion, and we discuss other provisions that appear to be application conditions
throughout this Article.
2003] 1113
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1112 20032
Virginia Law Review
blown judicial review-at least absent some good reason for courts
not to head down that path.
Of course, the judicial review skeptic has a good reason to try to
minimize the circumstances in which courts prefer their own un-
derstandings of the Constitution to those of politically accountable
actors: democracy. Furthermore, even though the constitutional
text does not distinguish between existence and application condi-
tions, there is a certain intuitive logic to regarding (for example)
Article I, Section 7 as setting forth the former and the Bill of
Rights (for example) as setting forth the latter-traditional under-
standings of judicial review notwithstanding. According to this in-
tuition, judges cannot avoid enforcing those provisions of the Con-
stitution that identify the procedure for legislation and perhaps
those that demarcate Congress's powers, but they can decline to
enforce provisions that merely express additional constraints on
duly enacted and empowered statutes. On this view, a bill enacted
by only one house of Congress is no law at all, while a duly enacted
statute that prohibits flag burning in interstate commerce is a law
that a court may or may not apply depending on whether it has
more than a minimal power of judicial review, and depending on
its substantive interpretation of the First Amendment.
In our view, the question whether a given constitutional provi-
sion states an existence condition or an application condition is it-
self a constitutional question, as an example illustrates. Suppose
the Constitution contained a provision stating that "a duly enacted
law that purports to exercise a power not granted to Congress by
this Constitution is void, and the courts shall disregard it in its en-
tirety." Such a provision would settle the question whether enu-
merated powers state existence or application conditions. In the
absence of such a provision, the constitutional question is simply
how to read the constitutional provisions we in fact have.
In sum, much (if not all) of the Constitution consists of existence
conditions rather than application conditions. Existence conditions
determine what counts as nonconstitutional law-for example,
whether some utterance by a self-styled Congress is a genuine stat-
ute. An existence condition cannot be "underenforced" once
courts are engaged in the task of adjudicating the nonconstitutional
law whose existence depends on the condition. Once courts are en-
gaged in that task, the existence condition is necessarily fully en-
1114 [Vol. 89:1105
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forced-although full judicial enforcement can take the form of
deference to some other actor, on epistemic grounds or where the
constitutional provision at hand is best read to require deference.
Finally, the question whether a constitutional provision falls in the
"existence" or "application" category is itself a question of consti-
tutional law, to be resolved using text, history, structure, doctrine,
and other ordinary sources of constitutional interpretation.
The balance of this Article will clarify and defend these claims.
Part I will set the stage by elaborating the distinction between exis-
tence and application criteria in greater detail. Although a docu-
ment (or in the case of an unwritten constitution, a set of practices)
could be denoted "the constitution," even if it did not play the role
of identifying nonconstitutional sources of law, we think that a con-
stitution typically will perform this function. In a legal system in
which the constitution does identify nonconstitutional sources of
law, we will ask, what does it mean for a judge (or other actor) to
"enforce" the constitution?
The judicial review skeptic and, for that matter, most constitu-
tional lawyers typically think of constitutional enforcement as con-
straining government actors, but this is a narrow and misleading
picture. A judge enforces the constitution, we will argue, simply if
her decision is sensitive to her beliefs about what the constitution
requires (at least in some respects). Even if she defers to experts
(such as the national legislature) on constitutional matters, she will
need to identify those experts in light of her preliminary beliefs
about what the constitution requires, since those beliefs will be
crucial in determining whether the purported experts are really ex-
perts on constitutional matters.
How much of the constitution the judge enforces will depend on
how many and which of its provisions "constitute"-state existence
conditions for-nonconstitutional law, or merely override it. Ac-
cordingly, Part II will ask how various provisions of the U.S. Con-
stitution are best categorized. To what extent are provisions re-
garding separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights best
conceptualized as existence conditions rather than application con-
ditions? We will conclude that many of the most familiar constitu-
tional provisions state existence conditions.
Part III will analyze and defuse apparent counterexamples to
our thesis that existence conditions are fully enforced: the "en-
2003] 1115
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rolled bill" doctrine (which apparently instructs courts to underen-
force Article I, Section 7 itself); the political question doctrine; "ra-
tional basis review" under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses; and others. The key to defusing these examples is a point
to which we have already alluded: that courts might have epistemic
or nonepistemic grounds for deference to nonjudicial actors with
respect to the interpretation of some existence condition. But does
not the point that full enforcement includes, perhaps, a posture of
deference render our "victory" over the advocates of underen-
forcement quite hollow? We think not. As Part III will explain, a
nonjudicial actor is owed epistemic deference only if it really is ex-
pert with respect to the constitutional provision at hand. And
nonepistemic considerations justify deference with respect to an
existence condition only if those considerations bear upon the very
meaning of that condition-only if they are "internal" to its inter-
pretation. In many cases where scholars have argued for underen-
forcement, neither of these grounds for deference will obtain.
We will turn first to showing what would be involved in a whole-
sale rejection of Marbury. Given the actual U.S. Constitution, it
turns out that such an effort would have to be Herculean, to say
the least. In a sense quite different from the one intended by John
Marshall, the judicial power "to say what the law is"28 literally en-
tails judicial power to construe (some and maybe much of) the
Constitution.29
28 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
29 It might be asserted that Marshall did intend to advance the very claim we are ad-
vancing-that constitutional existence conditions are necessarily enforced. Although
this is not the standard reading of Marbury's argument-the standard reading holds
that the crucial feature of higher law is that it limits nonconstitutional law rather than
defines it-there is some textual evidence for an alternative interpretation. For exam-
ple, Marshall states his position in the following way: "A legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law." Id. This could be read to mean that constitutionality goes to a
law's very existence. But, even thus interpreted, Marbury's argument differs from
ours. For Marbury never suggests that constitutional law might be a hybrid, in some
instances defining nonconstitutional law and in other instances merely constraining it.
The crucial distinction between existence conditions and application conditions is
never drawn. Thus Marbury's argument on this alternative reading is, to our minds,
unpersuasive. Because any given constitutional provision might be merely an applica-
tion condition, an argument that assumes the provision to be an existence condition
and, therefore, necessarily judicially enforced, is unconvincing. We are nonetheless
grateful to Professor Robin West for pressing us to recognize this alternative reading
of Marbury.
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I. EXISTENCE CONDITIONS AND APPLICATION CONDITIONS: THE
FRAMEWORK
A. Existence Conditions, Application Conditions, and the
Inevitability of Constitutional Enforcement
In this Part, we delineate a distinction between two types of con-
stitutional provisions: between what we call "existence conditions,"
and what we call "application conditions." This distinction (what-
ever the terms one uses to name it) has singular importance for ju-
dicial review, for the possibility of judicial underenforcement and
even nonenforcement of the Constitution, and for constitutional
law and theory more generally. Surprisingly, constitutional scholars
have largely overlooked it.
Consider the following two scenarios:
Is this a statute? John Smith sues his employer, Acme Manufac-
turing, in federal district court, claiming a violation of the "Safe
Workplaces Act" and seeking damages. A putative copy of the
Act, including an explicit cause of action for employees injured
as a result of employer violations, is appended to Smith's com-
plaint. Acme moves to dismiss and argues that the "Safe Work-
places Act" is a figment of Smith's imagination: no such statute
was ever enacted into law pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
Does this statute violate the Takings Clause? The Wetlands Pres-
ervation Act, a real federal statute, prohibits "industrial devel-
opment" on wetlands. The Secretary of the Interior sues Widget,
Inc. in federal district court under the fines provision of the Act.
Widget raises an "as applied" constitutional defense. It claims
that application of the Act to its particular wetlands parcel vio-
lates the Takings Clause3" because that parcel has zero value ex-
cept in industrial uses.
The constitutional provision at issue in the first lawsuit is, intui-
tively, an existence condition: Unless the "Safe Workplaces Act"
really was promulgated in accordance with Article I, Section 7, no
3 U.S. Const. amend. V.
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such statute exists. The constitutional provision at issue in the sec-
ond lawsuit is, intuitively, an application condition: The Wetlands
Preservation Act, if passed by both houses of Congress and signed
by the President, does not (seemingly) become a legal nullity
merely because certain applications of the statute deprive property
owners of all economic value and are therefore takings. Relatedly,
judicial "enforcement" of the Constitution, in Smith's case, is an
unavoidable prelude to ordinary, nonconstitutional adjudication: If
the statute on which Smith has predicated suit is not a statute at all,
then (once that objection has been raised by Acme or, if appropri-
ate, raised by the court sua sponte) the court should of course dis-
miss the suit, while if the objection is spurious and no other valid
objections are raised, the court should permit Smith's action to
proceed. The judge's ruling on Acme's motion is necessarily sensi-
tive (if she is conscientious) to her beliefs about what Article I,
Section 7 requires, for her view about the legal status of the "Safe
Workplaces Act" should depend upon those constitutional beliefs.
By contrast, constitutional "enforcement" in Widget's case is an
optional supplement to ordinary, nonconstitutional adjudication:"
Imagine that the judge in this case, for some reason, views her role
as deciding cases only in light of the totality of statutes and all
other relevant nonconstitutional sources of law. She agrees with
Professor Mark Tushnet that the Constitution should be "nonen-
forced."32 Then she can, at least in this case, do just that. Nothing in
the task of assessing the statutory validity of a fine, under the Wet-
lands Preservation Act, forces the judge to consider Widget's tak-
ings claim-or at least so it seems.
We will now make more precise the conceptual framework that
motivates our (and, we hope, the reader's) intuition that Smith's
and Widget's cases are quite different as regards the optionality of
constitutional judicial enforcement. We begin by defining our
terms to distinguish constitutional provisions that identify valid
"By saying that constitutional enforcement of an application condition is "op-
tional," we mean that further argumentation is needed to show that such a condition
should be enforced. Enforcement does not directly follow, as with existence condi-
tions, from the very task of nonconstitutional adjudication. We do not mean to say
that underenforcement of all or even some application conditions is actually the le-
gally correct posture for courts in the U.S. system. For more on this issue, see infra
text accompanying note 48.
2 See Tushnet, supra note 7.
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nonconstitutional legal norms-constitutional provisions the en-
forcement of which is entailed by the obligation to enforce those
nonconstitutional legal norms-from constitutional provisions that
limit the operation of, but do not play a role in identifying, noncon-
stitutional legal norms.
Existence Conditions and Application Conditions: A Definition
A constitutional provision states an "existence condition" for
some category of nonconstitutional law (federal statute, federal
common law, federal regulation, state law, and so forth) if it
states a necessary condition for any proposition to fall within that
category. 3 A constitutional provision states an "application con-
dition" for nonconstitutional law if the provision limits the legal
force of a proposition of nonconstitutional law by some means
other than vitiating the status of that proposition as law.
Consider once more the example of a federal statute. Of the in-
finity of normative propositions, a finite subset consists of federal
statutes or parts of federal statutes. What is the legal test for the
statutory status of some proposition? This test might take the sim-
ple form of a list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions, or it might take a more complicated form. It might be a
short test (for example, "a proposition is a federal statute if and
only if it is enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the Constitu-
tion"), or it might be a longer test (for example, "a proposition is a
federal statute if and only if it is thus enacted, falls within an enu-
merated power, satisfies all the provisions of Article I, Section 10,
" This definition might be too restrictive. The test for something to be a statute
could take the form of a list of disjunctive conditions: Proposition P is a statute if
passed in accordance with Article I, § 7, or if long accepted by courts as a statute,
or .... In that case, Article I, § 7 would not function as a necessary condition for a
proposition to be a statute; it would function merely as a necessary element of one set
of sufficient conditions. We do not pursue these complexities here because it seems
that the provisions in the Constitution plausibly functioning as existence conditions
would be necessary conditions for existence-at least if provisions are individuated in
fairly standard ways. For example, the Commerce Clause itself is not a necessary con-
dition for some utterance to be a federal law (since a proposition that exceeds the
bounds of the Commerce Clause can still be a statute if it falls within, say, the Spend-
ing Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), but the enumerated powers as a
whole either consist of application conditions or comprise a necessary condition for
some utterance to be a federal law.
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and is not so morally repugnant as to be void on those grounds").
This test might be wholly constitutional, or it might be partly extra-
constitutional.' Whatever the form, size, and status of the legal test
for federal statutes, a constitutional provision is an existence condi-
tion for federal statutes if it functions as a necessary condition
within that test. More generally, whatever the form, size, and status
of the legal test for some given type of law (federal statute, federal
regulation, state statute, state regulation, federal common law, and
so forth), a constitutional provision is an existence condition for
that type of law if no proposition can be law of that type unless the
provision is satisfied.
As for the concept of an "application condition," we define this
as a catch-all. How might a constitutional provision limit the legal
force of, say, federal statutes without functioning as a statutory ex-
istence condition? The obvious example is a provision that grounds
true "as-applied" constitutional rights: rights that prevent the ap-
plication of valid statutes in certain situations, or to certain types of
persons.35 Imagine that the following Veterans Protection Amend-
ment is added to the Constitution: "No veteran who commits a
crime as a result of a war injury may be punished for that crime."
This Amendment creates a constitutional immunity that prevents
the application of federal (and state) criminal statutes to certain
otherwise-punishable activities by veterans; it does not void or nul-
lify these statutes. It is also conceivable that constitutional provi-
sions might limit, without nullifying, valid law through some
mechanism other than "as-applied" challenges. (As a silly example,
imagine an Eclipse Amendment that blocks any enforcement of
' The test would be partly extraconstitutional if, for example, the rule of
recognition directly provided a partial definition of a statute but referred to the
Constitution to complete the definition. On the rule of recognition, see Hart, supra
note 13, at 100-10.
" Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev.
235, 236 (1994) [hereinafter Dorf, Facial Challenges] (acknowledging that "a court
may declare a statute unconstitutional in one of two manners ... [either] on its face,
or... as applied to a particular set of circumstances"); cf. Matthew D. Adler, Personal
Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?, 6 Legal Theory 337, 345-49
(2000) [hereinafter Adler, Personal Rights] (conceding that genuine as-applied provi-
sions can exist); Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of
American Constitutional Law, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 7-12 (1998) [hereinafter Adler,
Rights Against Rules] (viewing many constitutional provisions as creating facial
rather than as-applied rights).
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certain federal statutes during solar eclipses.) Although provisions
grounding "as-applied" challenges are the paradigm case of consti-
tutional provisions functioning as what we call "application" condi-
tions-hence the name-in principle the category is broader than
that.
Some further clarifications are in order. First, nothing in our dis-
tinction between existence and application conditions entails a tex-
tualist approach to constitutional interpretation or ontology. We
use the term "constitutional provision" for stylistic reasons, but by
this we simply mean some norm or principle or, more generally,
some proposition of constitutional law. The set of true propositions
of constitutional law may or may not map onto the set of sentences,
or textual "provisions," set forth in the canonical text we know as
the Constitution. The longstanding debates about constitutional in-
terpretation-between textualists and nontextualists, originalists
and nonoriginalists, moral readers and those who eschew moral
readings3"-are debates about the legal grounding for this proposi-
tional set: about the test for constitutionality. We do not mean to
take a side in these familiar debates here, nor do we need to.
Second, our framework is not meant to be exhaustive: Some
constitutional provisions might be neither existence conditions nor
application conditions. Consider Article V, which states an exis-
tence condition for constitutional law itself, not for federal statutes
or other sources of nonconstitutional law.37 Or consider the Oath
Clause of Article VI, which imposes a duty to swear an oath on
state and federal officials, and is neither (it seems) an existence
condition nor an application condition.3" These provisions are un-
usual, though, because the central function of the U.S. Constitution
is to constitute a federal government and to limit all governments in
the U.S. system, both federal and state. Thus, leaving aside special
" See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of
the Law (1990); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Ameri-
can Constitution (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law]; Paul Brest, The Mis-
conceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980); Thomas
C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); Rich-
ard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Michael Moore, The
Written Constitution and Interpretivism, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 3 (1989).
" U.S. Const. art. V.
38 Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
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cases like the Oath Clause, and leaving aside higher-order constitu-
tional provisions such as Article V that help to identify the content
of constitutional law itself, a constitutional provision generally will
fall into the existence or application category: It will indeed "con-
strain" the actions of government officials and would-be officials,
either by helping to define which utterances of theirs are legal ut-
terances, or by providing an additional legal norm, an additional
"source of law," that figures in the mix of legal considerations de-
termining private citizens' ultimate legal rights, duties, privileges,
and so forth.
Why do we make so much of the distinction between existence
and application conditions? Our chief claim in this Article is that
the distinction has much significance for the debate about judicial
review. As already suggested, this distinction goes to the very pos-
sibility of judicial nonenforcement or underenforcement of the
Constitution. Judicial nonenforcement or underenforcement of ap-
plication conditions, however inadvisable, is a possible judicial
practice; judicial nonenforcement or underenforcement of exis-
tence conditions is, as we will explain shortly, not possible. The
point can be stated more precisely: A judicial duty to take account
of some type of law, in adjudicating cases, entails a duty to enforce
constitutional provisions that state existence conditions for that type
of law. By "enforce," here, we have in mind a broad understanding
of judicial enforcement of the Constitution, not a narrower and
more coercive picture associated with a certain category of consti-
tutional litigation-(injunctive or declaratory) anticipatory litiga-
tion." A court enforces the Free Speech Clause4" when it enjoins a
government official from implementing a law that infringes speech.
It also enforces the Clause when it refuses to enter a sentence of
conviction or some other judicial directive against a constitutional
claimant whose statutory violation is predicated on his protected
speech. Similarly, the Commerce Clause" is "enforced" both
through judicial declarations "invalidating" statutes that exceed its
boundaries and through judicial judgments for defendants sued by
plaintiffs under statutes exceeding the Clause's boundaries. A
" Cf. Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35, at 132-52 (discussing judicial
enforcement in the narrower and more coercive sense).
0 U.S. Const. amend. 1.
41 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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judge "enforces" a constitutional provision if her decision is sensi-
tive to her beliefs about what the provision requires-if the provi-
sion figures in her official deliberations.
Note that judicial enforcement of the Constitution in this
broader sense, not in a narrower and more interventionist sense, is
what occurred in Marbury itself: The Supreme Court "enforced"
Article III by declining to issue the writ of mandamus sought by
Marbury. We hardly mean to claim that ordinary, nonconstitu-
tional adjudication entails a judicial power to issue injunctions or
other judicial directives against government officials, imposing
constitutional duties on them. Rather, we claim that the Constitu-
tion (insofar as it states existence conditions) inevitably figures in
the deliberations of the conscientious judge who is engaged in non-
constitutional adjudication and who is legally cognizant of the
sources of nonconstitutional law governed by these conditions. In
this very basic sense she inevitably "enforces" the Constitution.
The argument for this claim is straightforward. If (1) the judge is
under a legal duty to take account of some type of nonconstitu-
tional law in reaching her decisions, 2 then (2) she is under a legal
42 Note that this duty may be delimited by procedural requirements. For example,
Congress could probably require courts to hear claims arising under federal statutes
and stipulate that a court should enter judgment for a plaintiff who advances a statu-
tory claim, without determining whether the putative statute exists, if the defendant
does not appear. In such a case, the court would adjudicate the statutory claim with-
out enforcing-taking account of-the constitutional existence conditions for statutes.
Procedural rules governing nonconstitutional adjudication cannot be so constraining,
however, as to preclude judicial enforcement of relevant existence conditions in the
typical run of cases, thereby circumventing limits on Congress's power to pick and
choose among existence conditions. See infra Section III.E (arguing that Congress can
determine which types of nonconstitutional law should play a role in adjudication, but
that it lacks an additional power to waive the enforcement of constitutional existence
conditions). Drawing the line between legitimate procedural rules and illegitimate
congressional waivers of existence conditions is a difficult problem which we do not
attempt to resolve here. To see the problem, imagine that Congress stipulates that
courts should adjudicate claims under federal statutes, but that defendants who fail in
their answer or in a pre-answer motion to raise an Article I, § 7 bicameralism objec-
tion to a complaint advancing a statutory claim shall be deemed to have forfeited the
constitutional objection. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (specifying that defenses based
on lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of process and insuffi-
ciency of service of process are waived if not raised in pre-answer motion or answer).
This procedural rule would probably be acceptable, although the matter is hardly free
from doubt. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51
(1986) (holding that parties cannot consent to have a non-Article III forum adjudicate
a case that, absent consent, would have to be assigned to an Article III court, and thus
2003] 1123
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1122 20032
1124 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1105
duty to determine whether putative legal propositions of that type,
advanced by the parties, really do have legal force. Yet this entails
(3) a legal duty to determine whether these putative legal proposi-
tions satisfy the existence conditions stated by relevant constitu-
tional provisions.
The assumptions that drive this argument are minimal. We do
not presuppose an "inclusive" picture of adjudication: one where
the judge must take account of all law, or even all nonconstitu-
tional law. Imagine that Congress creates a "federal civil court"
that is obliged to consider those and only those civil causes of ac-
tions predicated on federal statutes and to entertain only federal
statutory defenses to those claims. The court would still need to en-
force Article I, Section 7 to do its job. The same would be true if
Congress were to create a "federal diversity court" empowered to
consider only state common law causes of action and explicitly in-
structed by Congress to ignore federal statutory defenses: Insofar
as the Constitution sets forth existence conditions for state law (for
example, in the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4 and per-
haps Article I, Section 10 and the Civil War Amendments), the "di-
versity court" would inevitably enforce those constitutional provi-
sions.
By saying that judicial enforcement of existence conditions is
"inevitable" or nonenforcement "impossible," we have in mind le-
gal possibility, not physical or moral possibility or possibility in
some other sense. A judge is not physically compelled to have con-
stitutional existence conditions figure in her deliberations; it is em-
pirically possible for her to decide cases based solely on her whims,
tastes, or policy preferences. Nor is a judge morally compelled to
enforce the Constitution: Insofar as the Constitution is unjust, it
might be morally best for her to ignore it. Rather, our claim con-
cerns legality. A legal duty to adjudicate will be a legal duty to take
account of at least some (if not all) of the various types of legal
implying possible limits on congressional ability to condition adjudication of existence
condition questions on party conduct). The doubts would become overwhelming if
Congress were to stipulate that an Article I, § 7 bicameralism objection is forfeited if
not raised within five minutes of the defendant's receiving the complaint (or in the
case of a statutory defense, within five minutes of the plaintiff's receiving the answer),
because, quite apart from any due process issue, the stipulation would be an imper-
missible effort by Congress to circumvent the limits posed by an existence condition.
Needless to say, there are intermediate cases.
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propositions that govern a case. This legal duty (whatever its
source) in turn entails a legal duty to enforce constitutional provi-
sions that state existence conditions for those types of law the
judge is bound to apply.
It bears emphasis that our claim about the inevitability or neces-
sity of judicial enforcement is a conditional claim. We do not claim
that all constitutional existence conditions necessarily come into
play when a court engages in nonconstitutional adjudication. For,
as already explained, Congress can limit the scope of nonconstitu-
tional adjudication in the federal courts. Congress can surely in-
struct federal courts to ignore state law, and may well be able to in-
struct them to ignore various types of federal law as well. The claim
is rather that, if Congress has instructed a court to entertain claims
or defenses grounded in some type of nonconstitutional law, then a
court must necessarily take account of constitutional existence
conditions relevant to that type of law. This claim is conceptual,
and thus a claim of necessity, but it is conditional rather than abso-
lute."
Our argument rules out the wholesale nonenforcement of consti-
tutional provisions. But, even more powerfully, it rules out under-
enforcement as well. Imagine that the Commerce Clause is indeed
an existence condition for federal statutes, not merely an applica-
tion condition, and is best understood to mean that the federal
government may only regulate activities given interstate external-
ities, collective action problems, or other such "federalism failures"
precluding effective state regulation. A court might be tempted to
underenforce this provision, say, through a "rational basis" test: If
Congress had a rational basis for thinking that state regulation
would not be effective, a Commerce Clause challenge to the fed-
eral statute will be rejected." But if the Commerce Clause is truly
an existence condition, this underenforcement posture is legally
"But if Congress can control federal court jurisdiction, why is it limited to all-or-
nothing choices with respect to various types of nonconstitutional law? Why can it not
instruct a court to entertain claims or defenses arising under some type of nonconsti-
tutional law, and to enforce some but not all of the existence conditions relevant to
that type? This issue is considered at length below. See infra Section III.E.
" See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603-15 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968) (quoting
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964)).
2003] 1125
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1124 20032
1126 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1105
improper. For if the Commerce Clause is truly an existence condi-
tion, a proposition that may satisfy other tests for statutory status
but fails to satisfy the Commerce Clause is no more a real federal
statute than a bill that passes the House but not the Senate, or, for
that matter, than the scribblings of a crackpot litigant. The judge
who (1) believes that Congress had a rational basis for believing
that federalism failures prevented effective state action, and thus
for enacting the text relied upon by some litigant, but also (2) be-
lieves that federalism failures did not in fact prevent effective state
action, is (on the hypothesis that he knows the Commerce Clause
to be an existence condition) in the position of believing that the
text lacks the legal force of a statute.
But what about constitutional doctrines, such as the political
question doctrine, that do wholly preclude judicial enforcement
and seemingly apply, or can apply, to existence as well as applica-
tion conditions? And what about the widespread judicial use of
"rational basis" tests and the like, again under provisions that quite
plausibly concern the very existence of nonconstitutional law, not
its application? These questions are entertained at length in Part
III, where we consider putative counterexamples to the claim that
constitutional provisions stating existence conditions are necessar-
ily fully enforced. To anticipate the answers we develop there, we
would note first that judicial deference on epistemic grounds to the
judgments of nonjudicial actors is not underenforcement at all. If
the court believes that Congress is expert and conscientious with
respect to some constitutional provision P stating an existence con-
dition for federal statutes, and therefore takes as a full-fledged
statute any proposition satisfying every other condition for statu-
tory status, then the court's decision is sensitive to its beliefs about
what P requires: Congressional enactment of the text at issue func-
tions as evidence, for the court, that P is satisfied. 5
The real puzzle for our view is judicial deference on nonepis-
temic grounds to the judgments of nonjudicial actors. Our answer
here is that the Constitution may require courts to take as authori-
4 On epistemic grounds for judicial deference, see Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Re-
straint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 759, 804-05 (1997) [hereinafter Adler, Judicial Restraint]. On epistemic
grounds for deference more generally, see, Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100
Yale L.J. 1611 (1991).
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tative the judgment of some nonjudicial body that some existence
criterion is satisfied. In effect, existence conditions can be institu-
tion-specific, or perspectival. For example, the test for whether a
proposition is a statute might be different for different actors: The
Constitution might create one such test for the President, another
for Congress, another for the Supreme Court, another for the
lower federal courts, and so on. The correct test, for courts, might
refer (in part) to the conscientious judgments of various nonjudi-
cial actors. A court that, in conformity with this perspectival test,
defers to the judgment of some nonjudicial actor is fully enforc-
ing-not underenforcing-the test. Further, judicial application of
perspectival constitutional tests for legality that refer courts to the
decisions of other actors involves genuine constitutional analysis
and reasoning as much as judicial application of nonperspectival
tests. Imagine that the Constitution is best interpreted as instruct-
ing federal courts to defer to the highest state court in determining
whether some proposition is state law. Federal courts will then
need to determine whether the putative "state supreme court" that
makes assertions about state law within some state is really the
highest state court (for federal constitutional purposes) or an im-
postor. And if the federal courts decide to defer to Congress or
some other actor in identifying state supreme courts, they will need
to justify that decision on either epistemic or other, constitutional,
grounds.
The argument for judicial review that we have just articulated
and that we develop further in Part III is different from Marbury's.
The central thrust of Marshall's argument-as the argument is
generally understood-is that the Constitution is higher law, the
source for a type of law that is supreme over other types.4 How
could a court that considered nonsupreme law ignore paramount
law? This argument, if sound, requires judicial enforcement of con-
stitutional provisions stating application as well as existence condi-
tions. To be sure, Marshall's language at various points suggests
that he views all of the Constitution as stating existence rather than
application conditions.47 But, once more, this is not our view-or at
46 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
41 Id. ("[T]he theory of every.., government [with a written constitution] must be,
that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void."); see supra note
29 (discussing this alternative reading of Marbury).
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least it does not follow from the status of the Constitution as law,
higher law, or written law. A clause at the beginning of the Bill of
Rights stating explicitly that these amendments did not serve to
"nullify" or "void" inconsistent statutes would not render the Con-
stitution incoherent.
We have discussed, at some length, the enforceability of exis-
tence conditions. What about the enforceability of application con-
ditions? We do not mean to assert that judges may underenforce
such provisions. The propriety of underenforcing application con-
ditions implicates longstanding debates that we do not mean to en-
ter. Judicial enforcement of application conditions is not an inevi-
table component of nonconstitutional adjudication, but it might
still be legally mandated. For example, Article III and/or the Judi-
ciary Acts might be read as requiring courts to ignore the litigation
costs, democratic costs, legitimacy costs, and so forth that may at-
tend constitutional litigation, and to fully enforce all constitutional
provisions. Alternatively, it might be argued that both Article III
and the statutes governing the federal courts are sufficiently open-
ended to permit such "institutional" considerations to trigger genu-
ine underenforcement4" of various constitutional application condi-
tions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to take a position in this
debate. Our point is rather that the debate is irrelevant to the en-
forceability of existence conditions. The considerations bearing on
the enforcement of application conditions are just different from
those bearing on the enforcement of existence conditions. How-
ever persuasive the case for underenforcement of application con-
ditions might be, the case for full enforcement of provisions that
determine which propositions have the status of nonconstitutional
law remains compelling.
" By genuine underenforcement we mean judicial cognizance of litigation costs,
democratic costs, legitimacy costs, and other such considerations even where these do
not bear upon the best interpretation of the constitutional provision at hand-even
where they are "external," not "internal," to constitutional interpretation. For more
on this distinction between the permissible role of institutional considerations with
respect to existence conditions, and theirpermissible role with respect to application
conditions, see infra text accompanying notes 215-21.
[Vol. 89:11051128
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B. Distinguishing Application from Existence Conditions
Does a constitution necessarily contain existence conditions for
laws within the legal system that it governs? The answer to that
question depends on the meaning of "constitution"-an issue we
have not pursued at length here. If, for example, a "constitution" is
a set of legally supreme norms grounded in a written document,
then in principle constitutions can consist entirely of application
conditions. On this view, a written "Declaration of Rights" that ar-
ticulated Dworkinian rights functioning as trumps on legislation,"
and that was unamendable through ordinary legislative processes,
would be a full-fledged constitution that judges within the system
could nonetheless ignore in determining what had the status of
nonconstitutional law.
Does the U.S. Constitution contain existence conditions? Surely
it does. First, there are provisions Americans intuitively under-
stand as (partly) constituting the difference between law and
nonlaw-for example, Article I, Section 7, a provision we have in-
voked several times. Second, and more generally, Americans think
of the Constitution as constituting at least one government within
the U.S. legal system-the federal government. The Constitution,
transparently, creates key federal institutions: Congress, a Presi-
dent, the Supreme Court. Even if the test for federal law were oth-
erwise wholly extraconstitutional-directly stated in the rule of
recognition 0 say-presumably that test would refer to these institu-
tions. If, instead, the test said "a proposition is a law if enacted in a
certain way by Kongress [not identical to the Congress created by
the Constitution]," then this "constitutive" understanding of the
Constitution would be exploded.
Thus, at least some of the Constitution sets forth existence con-
ditions for federal law. That much is clear. This claim alone has
considerable importance, for it undermines the possibility of
wholesale judicial nonenforcement of the Constitution. Assume
that Article I, Sections 1 though 7 and Article II, Section 1 state ex-
istence conditions for federal statutes, while Article I, Sections 8
" For a discussion of the concept of rights as "trumps," see Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (1978) [hereinafter Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously]; Ronald
Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Theories of Rights 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
"0 See text accompanying infra note 54.
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and 9 and the Bill of Rights state application conditions. Then
judges engaged in ordinary adjudication and bound to take account
of federal statutes are (without more) free to ignore the enumer-
ated powers clauses of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, but
are not free to ignore the entire document.
But we intend to do more than show that some of the Constitu-
tion states existence conditions for federal law. The claim we de-
fend in Part II is that much of the Constitution consists of existence
conditions for federal and even state law, including Article I, Sec-
tion 8; the separation-of-powers provisions; and even much of the
Bill of Rights-provisions that are now widely viewed as underen-
forced, in line with numerous scholarly proposals to that effect."
Our claim, it should be stressed, is not that the Constitution neces-
sarily or in fact consists entirely of existence conditions.52 Nor is it
that the existence conditions for law within the U.S. system are en-
tirely set forth in the Constitution. This is clearly not the case with
regard to state law, and it may not be true for federal law either.
Our claim is substantive rather than conceptual-grounded in sub-
stantive arguments about particular clauses, not in the putatively
necessary features of any provision in any constitution or in the
U.S. Consitution-and should not be conflated with the claim that
the whole test for legality is contained in the Constitution. The
whole test for legality, in the U.S. system, is not contained in the
Constitution, but the function of much, if not all, of the Constitu-
tion is to contribute to that test.3
But how can one determine whether a given provision in the
Constitution states an existence condition or an application condi-
tion (or something else)? Answering that question requires us to
address a deep methodological issue: Is the characterization of a
"See sources cited infra note 183.
2Consider, in this regard, the Oath Clause in Article VI, or the Thirteenth
Amendment insofar as it prohibits private persons from enslaving others.
" We do not mean to suggest that the Constitution is any part of the ultimate test for
legality in the American legal system. The positivist would insist that it is not-that
the ultimate test consists in the rule of recognition, which directly or indirectly refers
to the Constitution. See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the
Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621, 622 (1987) (arguing "that the rule of recognition
[includes] a number of standards and [is] quite complex, omitting some of the federal
Constitution while including aspects of state law and interpretive standards used by
judges").
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constitutional provision as an existence versus application condi-
tion itself a question of constitutional law? Or is that question ex-
traconstitutional?
To address that issue, we must briefly detour away from consti-
tutional theory and into analytical jurisprudence. The role of the
Constitution in defining law cannot be wholly separated from yet
more basic and general questions about the nature of law. The
dominant, contemporary position in analytical jurisprudence is
positivism." The positivist says (roughly) that the ultimate criterion
of legality in any legal system is a "rule of recognition": a rule that
is followed by officials and is taken by them to have normative
force, and that directly, or by incorporation, grounds all legal
rights, duties, privileges, and so forth. Any condition for legality is
either stated directly in the rule of recognition, or is stated in some
other rule whose role in providing legality conditions itself derives
from the rule of recognition.
How would the positivist answer the methodological question
with which we are now grappling: Is the status of a constitutional
provision as an existence condition settled by the Constitution it-
self, or rather extraconstitutionally? The positivist would answer
that question by looking to official practice: the practice constitu-
tive of the rule of recognition. Two different practices are possible.
Officials might follow a "thick" rule that incorporates the Constitu-
tion, but itself determines the characterization of constitutional
provisions. One example is as follows:
A Thick Rule of Recognition
- A proposition constitutes a federal statute if and only if it satis-
fies the procedures for promulgating statutes set forth in the
Constitution, that is, the procedures set forth in Article I, Section
7.
- Duly promulgated statutes that violate other constitutional
provisions are not void, but their enforcement can be limited by
judges.
4 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist
Approach to Legal Theory (2001); Hart, supra note 13; Raz, supra note 17.
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In effect, this thick rule itself determines that Article I, Section 7,
plus the provisions defining the actors relevant for that Section
(Congress and the President), but not the rest of the Constitution,
state existence conditions for federal statutes. However, it is also
possible for officials to follow a "thin" rule of recognition-one
that incorporates the Constitution more thoroughly. The content of
the thin rule would amount to something like the following:
A Thin Rule of Recognition
- A proposition constitutes a law of some type (such as a federal
statute, a federal regulation, or a state statute) if and only if it
satisfies the criteria for legality set forth in the rule of recognition
itself, the Constitution, and all other rules derivative of these.
- Whether a constitutional provision sets forth an existence con-
dition for some type of law is itself a constitutional question.
Both the thin and the thick rules are possibilities, but which is
the actual rule within the U.S. system? This is an empirical ques-
tion, which cannot definitively be settled here. It seems reasonably
clear, however, that officials within the U.S. system follow a thin,
rather than a thick, rule. The issue can be framed thus: If the ordi-
nary, conscientious official were to believe that the Constitution
purported to nullify a law that failed to satisfy some constitutional
provision, would the official then treat the law as a nullity, or might
she give legal effect to the law in the teeth of her constitutional un-
derstanding? Our own intuition about this question, as well-
socialized participants in the U.S. legal system (which constitutes
evidence about the understandings of other well-socialized partici-
pants, including officials), is that a constitutionally void law is no
law at all.
Imagine that the Constitution explicitly stated the following at
the beginning of Article I: "Any law inconsistent with any section
of this Article is null and void." If judges followed a thick rule of
recognition, then even such a crystal clear constitutional meta-
provision would not settle the question whether, say, Article I, Sec-
tion 8 states existence or application conditions. But we think it
apparent, given the actual Constitution and constitutional culture,
that most judges would regard the constitutional meta-provision as
[Vol. 89:11051132
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itself resolving the existence condition question, and if we are right
in that assessment, this suggests quite strongly that the current rule
of recognition in the actual U.S. legal system is thin, not thick.
Accordingly, if positivism provides an accurate account of the
nature of law, we can determine whether a given constitutional
provision goes to existence or application by using the ordinary
sources of constitutional interpretation: text, history, structure, and
moral considerations, as appropriately ordered by the correct in-
terpretive theory. We look to the Constitution itself to answer the
question of characterization.
But what if positivism is wrong?55 The most important competing
theory within modern jurisprudence is Professor Ronald Dworkin's
account.56 Professor Dworkin's account is more thoroughly moral-
ized than the positivist's. Positivists (or at least some positivists) al-
low that moral considerations can determine legality insofar as
these are incorporated by the rule of recognition, or by rules such
as a constitution whose legality derives from the rule, but no posi-
tivist would allow that moral considerations can determine legality
" Jurisprudents may object that we have ignored the debate between hard and soft
positivism. Very roughly, hard positivists believe that the law must be identifiable ac-
cording to its source-in the case of a federal statute, for example, by whether it was
enacted by Congress in conformity with Article I, § 7-and not by reference to moral
considerations. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 17, at 47-48; Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's
Way Out, 4 Legal Theory 469, 476 (1998). Soft positivists insist only on the conceptual
possibility that law could be identified by its sources without regard to moral consid-
erations, but allow that in some legal systems, the rule of recognition could make
moral considerations relevant to identifying the law. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 13, at
250; Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1982).
Our argument that a positivist would regard the question whether a given constitu-
tional provision states an existence condition or an application condition as a constitu-
tional question applies to both hard and soft positivists. Nothing in the claim that offi-
cial practice recognizes the existence/application distinction as a constitutional (not
extraconstitutional) issue entails the view that constitutional existence conditions in-
corporate moral considerations.
To be sure, some of what we claim may prove problematic for hard positivists. In
particular, we argue in Part II that some constitutional rights provisions are best read,
at least in some circumstances, as existence conditions. To the extent that those rights
provisions-such as the guaranty of equal protection of the laws-and others are best
read to incorporate moral considerations, the hard positivist cannot treat them as ex-
istence conditions, for that would violate the sources thesis. Yet we believe that the
sorts of reasons that lead hard positivists to hard positivism would also lead them to
conclude that provisions of the Constitution that incorporate moral considerations (if
there are any) are not existence conditions.
56 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 254-58 (1986).
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in the teeth of the rule of recognition. Professor Dworkin thinks
otherwise. He suggests (very roughly) that legality is a function of
both "fit" with existing practices and moral values. Imagine a judge
who (1) believes that prevailing practice is to look to various, rec-
ognized sources of constitutional interpretation in determining
whether some constitutional provision wholly "voids" laws incon-
sistent with it, or merely trumps them, but (2) believes that it
would be morally better to announce that the characterization of
some provision as an existence condition or application condition is
not itself an issue of constitutional law, and to resolve the charac-
terization issue in a way that would not generally be seen as consti-
tutional reasoning. Then this judge (in line with Dworkin's ac-
count) might depart from the recognized sources of constitutional
interpretation in determining whether some provision is an exis-
tence or application condition. She would do so if she concluded
that this decision would not create too much "misfit" with existing
practice and that the moral value of doing so was sufficiently large.
We will not enter into the debate between positivists and
Dworkinians here. Nor will we attempt a full analysis of the moral
issue just identified that arises within Dworkin's account: whether
a judicial decision to employ reasoning that would be seen as ex-
traconstitutional in order to determine whether some constitu-
tional provision voids or merely overrides inconsistent law could
ever have sufficient moral value to warrant the evident misfit with
practice, and thus render such a decision legally correct. We are
quite skeptical, however, about the moral value of departing from
constitutional practices in this way.
Our skepticism is grounded in the fact that moral considerations
have a recognized role within our constitutional practices. For ex-
ample, imagine a judge faced with the decision of whether the
Commerce Clause states an existence condition or an application
condition: specifically, whether a statute that has been enacted in
accordance with Article I, Section 7, but applies to various activi-
ties that (as the judge reads the Commerce Clause) exceed federal
power, should be wholly nullified or merely restricted in scope to
activities that (as the judge sees it) are permissibly regulated at the
federal level. Now imagine that the judge believes it would be
morally best to wholly invalidate the statute. Then she can do so
without flying in the face of the prevailing view that the role of the
[Vol. 89:11051134
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Commerce Clause is itself a constitutional issue. The judge might
adduce the moral considerations she takes to be important as a fac-
tor bearing on constitutional interpretation and conclude that, as a
matter of constitutional interpretation, the Commerce Clause is an
existence condition. Or, if she is reluctant to categorize the Com-
merce Clause in this way, given the implications for other cases,
she might bracket the issue but determine that-in light of the
moral considerations she sees as grounds for nullifying the stat-
ute-the severability clause of the statute should be read to pre-
clude severance of the permissible from the impermissible applica-
tions. It is difficult to see why the judge would need to depart from
prevailing characterization practices and characterize her decision
to remedy the Commerce Clause violation by voiding the statute as
"extraconstitutional."
What this example suggests is that misfit at the level of charac-
terization practice57 would rarely be morally justified, since the
Dworkinian judge could instead preserve fit at the level of charac-
terization practice and (consistent with an approach to constitu-
tional interpretation followed by many judges and citizens) de-
scribe the moral grounds for her decision as sources of
constitutional law, for example, sources incorporated through
open-ended constitutional texts such as the Equal Protection
Clause or, alternatively, nontextual sources of constitutional law.
Admittedly, this example is merely suggestive. Still, it seems plau-
sible that for the Dworkinian, as for the positivist, the question
whether a constitutional provision states an existence condition for
nonconstitutional law or a mere constraint (application condition),
should itself be considered a question of constitutional law. The
methodology for the inquiry to which we now turn is constitutional
rather than extraconstitutional.
" By "characterization practice" here, we mean the practice of bringing to bear or-
dinary sources of constitutional interpretation in determining whether a constitutional
provision states an application or existence provision-or, in other words, the practice
of viewing the existence/application determination as a constitutional rather than ex-
traconstitutional determination.
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II. PARSING THE CONSTITUTION FOR EXISTENCE CONDITIONS AND
APPLICATION CONDITIONS
This Part parses the Constitution into existence conditions and
application conditions. In our view, one can make a plausible ar-
gument for the conclusion expressed by what was formerly the
conventional wisdom: "An unconstitutional act is not a law.... "58
Our aim, however, is not to defend the proposition that every con-
stitutional provision states an existence condition. Instead, we aim
to dislodge the intuition that procedural mechanisms such as Arti-
cle I, Section 7 are the only existence conditions, whereas substan-
tive provisions such as the enumerated powers and individual
rights clauses are application conditions. We argue in this Part that
the category of existence conditions includes more than just proce-
dural provisions. 9 We work from the inside out, beginning with
constitutional provisions that most clearly function as existence
conditions and ending with less clear-cut examples. In turn, we ad-
dress: (A) provisions that designate official actors such as Congress
and the President; (B) provisions and doctrines-such as separa-
tion of powers-that define the mechanisms of lawmaking; (C)
provisions and doctrines-such as federalism-that state subject
matter limitations on lawmaking; and (D) provisions and doctrines
that set forth individual rights.
' Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
As we concluded in the previous Part, the question whether a particular constitu-
tional provision states an existence condition or an application condition is itself a
question of constitutional law. Accordingly, we analyze it using the conventional tools
of constitutional interpretation, including doctrine. The consideration of doctrine
might seem to render our argument circular. After all, the principal point of distin-
guishing existence conditions from application conditions is to justify judicial review
for, at a minimum, the former. But if doctrine plays a role in this analysis, we might be
said to have loaded the dice, for Marbury itself is a substantial precedent that is inter-
twined with the very cases upon which our argument relies. Thus, a charge of circular-
ity might be raised. We would respond to this charge by noting that doctrine plays a
relatively small role in our analysis. Moreover, even where we invoke cases, we tend
to eschew doctrinal arguments qua doctrinal arguments. For example, in discussing
both Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) and the enumerated powers cases, we point to
the fact of consensus among Justices that various constitutional provisions are exis-
tence conditions, notwithstanding heated disagreement about the substantive content
of these provisions. In these examples, we use their agreement epistemically: The fact
that expert constitutionalists believe the provisions under discussion to be existence
conditions counts as evidence that they are best understood that way.
1136
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A. Designating Official Actors
Recall the core example elaborated so far. Plaintiff Smith ap-
pears before federal district judge Jones with a purported federal
statute that grants Smith rights against defendant Acme. Before
applying the statute, Jones must identify Congress and the Presi-
dent. Under rare circumstances, we can imagine disputes arising
about the identity of each of these actors.
Begin with Congress. Was the Reconstruction Congress that en-
acted the Fourteenth Amendment and ordinary legislation during
the exclusion of the southern congressional delegations actually
Congress? Although the question has been settled as a matter of
doctrine,' it was once a live issue. Indeed, even today, legal schol-
ars unsympathetic to the secessionist cause treat the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment as suspect under Article V because of
the exclusion of southern Representatives.6' Unfortunately, it does
not take any great leap of imagination to imagine that, following a
catastrophic terrorist attack that crippled the government in Wash-
ington, there might be uncertainty as to which, if any, surviving leg-
islators-totaling less than a quorum, perhaps-were authorized to
act as Congress. As in the case of the Dorr Rebellion,62 after the
crisis had passed, the courts might be called upon to adjudicate
claims concerning the identity of the legislature. Yet in contrast to
the circumstances surrounding the Dorr Rebellion-which in-
volved the identity of a state legislature-with the identity of the
national legislature uncertain, the courts obviously could not defer
to the judgment of Congress. 3
' Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1939) ("This decision by the political de-
partments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been accepted."); United States v. Ass'n of Citizens Councils, 187 F.
Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. La. 1960) ("With all deference to able counsel, we find our-
selves unable to agree with th[e] contention [that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were adopted unconstitutionally] in the light of the hundreds of cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has applied these Amendments.").
61 See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 99-119 (1998). Pursuant
to his theory that amendment occurs during "constitutional moments" that need not
comply with Article V, Ackerman concludes that the Reconstruction Amendments
are indeed rightfully deemed part of the Constitution. Id. at 120-252.
62 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
63 Cf. supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing how the federal courts defer
to Congress or state courts in determining the legitimate government of a state).
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Disputes as to the President's identity might also arise. One can
readily imagine a somewhat different conclusion to the 2000 presi-
dential election, in which both George Bush and Al Gore claim au-
thority to act as President, Congress deadlocks, and the courts are
called upon to decide who is the true President.6' In such circum-
stances, the political question doctrine would not be available.
Again, in contrast to the Dorr Rebellion, in the imaginary "Gore
Rebellion," there would be no federal authority to whom the
courts might readily defer.
Are the constitutional provisions that establish Congress and the
President best read as existence conditions or application condi-
tions? It is difficult to understand how they could be read as any-
thing other than existence conditions.65 The Constitution is a consti-
tution precisely because it constitutes the federal government.
To be sure, one can envision circumstances in which the elec-
toral provisions of the Constitution would not state existence con-
ditions. Suppose, for example, that one political party were to be-
come so dominant that real power was concentrated in that party's
leadership. Suppose further that, over time, the entire apparatus of
federal elections became a mere formality, so that the President
and Congress took their marching orders from the party. Eventu-
ally, the seat of lawmaking power might shift to party standing
committees and the like, even without a formal amendment of the
Constitution. At that point, it seemingly would no longer be accu-
rate to say that the Constitution set forth existence conditions for
Congress and the President, but of course, under circumstances of
one-party totalitarianism, the Constitution would cease to operate
as law. In the existing U.S. legal culture, the mechanisms the Con-
stitution establishes for selecting Congress and the President oper-
ate to identify the laws that those actors have a role in creating.
64 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the
Election Deadlock and Ensuing Litigation, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 42-46 & 45 n.73
(considering recount scenario in which the Speaker of the House or President pro
tempore of the Senate would serve as President "until the winner of the 2000 presi-
dential election was somehow determined").
". These provisions are "indirect" existence conditions in the sense that they do not
directly define some type of nonconstitutional law, but instead define the institutions
that are referenced by constitutional provisions that do directly define some type of
nonconstitutional law. Article I, § 7, for example, refers to the "House of Representa-
tives," the "Senate," and the "President."
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Next suppose that the current Congress enacts the "Safeguard-
ing Our Democracy Act" ("SODA"), which indefinitely extends
the terms of Senators, Representatives, and the President.66 Pursu-
ant to its powers under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, and Article
II, Section 1, Clause 4, Congress then repeals the statutory provi-
sion designating the first Tuesday in November as election day,67
substituting in its stead "such day as shall be set forth in further
legislation declaring that the threat to American democracy from
terrorists and rogue states has passed." Despite SODA, a majority
of states attempt to hold federal elections on November 2, 2004,
and the winners of these elections attempt to take their seats in
Congress at noon on January 3, 2005, as provided in Section 1 of
the Twentieth Amendment.' The holdover Congress refuses to
seat them, citing SODA and the proposition that "the Constitution
is not a suicide pact."69 The electoral victors assemble on the tennis
courts adjacent to the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washing-
ton, D.C. and begin enacting legislation, which is then submitted to
the victorious candidate for President for signing on January 20,
the day designated by the Twentieth Amendment as the end of the
holdover President's term.7" Do these enactments have the status of
law?
The political question doctrine provides little shelter for the
holdover Congress and President. As in Powell v. McCormack,7'
there is no claim that the new members of Congress lack the quali-
"'While this hypothetical may seem far-fetched, recent events suggest otherwise.
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's proposal to extend his own mayoral term
by three months in the aftermath of the September llth attacks gained considerable
support, including the endorsement of both the Democratic and Republican nominees
to succeed him. See Adam Nagourney, Battle in New York Mayor's Race: Cash vs.
'Instinct for the Jugular,' N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2001, at Al.
672 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
'6 U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1. ("[T]he terms of Senators and Representatives [shall
end] at noon on the 3d day of January ... and the terms of their successors shall then
bekin.").
Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
70 U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1. ("The term[] of the President ... shall end at noon on
the 20th day of January .... ).
" 395 U.S. 486, 516-49 (1969) (finding the question whether the House of Represen-
tatives could refuse to seat a member who, by the House's own admission, satisfied
the constitutional criteria for membership, was justiciable).
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fications for office. Indeed, in Powell it was at least plausible to ar-
gue that the Constitution's silence permitted Congress to impose
qualifications beyond those set forth in the document, whereas
SODA directly conflicts with the Twentieth Amendment. More-
over, as we explain in greater detail in Part III, even if a court were
to treat the question of which entity is Congress-the holdovers in
the Capitol or the newcomers on the tennis court-as nonjusticia-
ble, that decision itself, and the decision about whose judgment to
accept as resolving the issue, would require the court to interpret
the Constitution.
In any event, whatever temptation one may feel to treat the
choice between two rival entities claiming to be Congress as a non-
justiciable political question results from an unnecessarily expan-
sive reading of Luther v. Borden.72 That case surely should not be
read as stripping the federal courts of all power to resolve contests
between rival claimants to legislative authority. Rather, the Luther
Court merely read the Guaranty Clause as establishing the federal
government as the ultimate authority on what entity is a state gov-
ernment. 3 True, under the Guaranty Clause it is "the United
States" that guarantees the states a "Republican Form of Govern-
ment," not Congress." Accordingly, the Supreme Court might have
thought that it, as an arm of the United States, was responsible for
identifying the legitimate government of Rhode Island. 5 Yet it was
also quite plausible to think that the act of guaranteeing a republi-
can form of government would typically require force of arms, and
therefore was best left in the hands of the political branches. The
main point, though, is that there is no meta-Guaranty Clause in the
Constitution, stating, for example, that the United Nations shall
guarantee to the United States a republican form of government.
Accordingly, notwithstanding Luther, in contests over the identity
of the federal legislature or executive, federal courts will have to
72 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (finding that federal courts lack the authority to adjudi-
cate between two opposing factions, each of which claims to constitute the legitimate
government of a state).
7 Id. at 42.
14 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
" See Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of
Powers, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 51, 59-67 (1998) [hereinafter Dorf, Federal
Norms] (exploring the limits of the principle that Guaranty Clause claims are not jus-
ticiable).
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1139 20032
Constitutional Existence
make the choice themselves according to constitutional criteria. At
the very least, the courts will have to explain-by reference to con-
stitutional criteria-how and why they are deferring to some other
federal actor (such as Congress in a dispute over the identity of the
President or the President in a dispute over the identity of Con-
gress).
The SODA example illustrates that the stakes in a contest over
the identity of Congress or the President can be quite high, but the
exact same problem is implicit in every invocation of a federal stat-
ute. It is, after all, always open to a defendant (or a plaintiff in the
case of a putative statutory defense) to argue that the body that
"enacted" the putative statute was a band of impostors. We doubt
that there would be much uproar created by a decision by a federal
judge that a "statute" enacted by the inmates of a maximum secu-
rity prison created no legal rights or duties, despite the inmates'
claim to be Congress, because, in the judge's best reading of the
Constitution, the inmates in fact are not Congress.
If the Constitution states the existence conditions for Congress
and the President, it plays a smaller but still important role in set-
ting forth existence conditions for state lawmakers. For one thing,
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 plays a leading role in identifying
what entities are states.76 Accordingly, if Congress were to admit
the island of Manhattan to statehood over the objection of the New
York state legislature, in clear violation of Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 1, that act of admission would be ineffective and, for exam-
ple, federal courts sitting in diversity suits would not recognize
Manhattan's utterances as state law-unless, pursuant to the sorts
of arguments considered in Part III, the courts were to conclude
that the issue presented a nonjusticiable political question.77
76 New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, with-
out the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
" See Adam H. Kurland, Partisan Rhetoric, Constitutional Reality, and Political
Responsibility: The Troubling Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C. State-
hood by Simple Legislation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 475, 502 (1992) (suggesting the
possibility "that Congress' decision to admit new states is a nonjusticiable political
question").
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Article IV's Guaranty Clause also entails existence conditions
for state institutions and actors."8 If former Governor Jesse Ventura
attempted to exercise absolute power as King of Minnesota, that
attempt surely would violate the Guaranty Clause, and Congress
could plainly authorize and effectuate his removal even if the fed-
eral courts, absent congressional intervention, would be obliged to
recognize Ventura's decrees as Minnesota law.79 Moreover, the
broadest legal realist reading of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"-
in which state law is whatever a state high court says it is'-must
be rejected as inconsistent with the existence condition for state in-
stitutions set forth in the Guaranty Clause. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court could not, consistent with the Guaranty Clause, de-
clare itself the absolute ruler of Minnesota any more than could
former Governor Ventura.
Just how far toward absolute authority state high courts can
stray (consistent with the Constitution) is unclear. Writing for him-
self, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas in his concurrence in Bush
v. Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that, where the federal
Constitution assigns a federal function to a state "legislature," the
state high court's construction of that body's enactments is subject
to "independent, if still deferential" review by the U.S. Supreme
78 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Appli-
cation of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be con-
vened) against domestic Violence." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
" As we noted in Part I and further explain in Part III, a constitutional provision can
operate as an existence condition for some actor or branch but not for others. The
Guaranty Clause may be such a provision. But see New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (noting that "the Court has suggested that perhaps not all
claims under the Guaranty Clause present nonjusticiable political questions" (citing
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964))); Dorf, Federal Norms, supra note 75, at
59 n.38 (citing academic literature suggesting Guaranty Clause justiciability).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8' See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651, 707
(1995) [hereinafter Dorf, Prediction] (describing Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the
Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), as endorsing "the radical re-
alist view that state law is, by definition, precisely what the state judges say it is"). The
classic statement of this legal realist credo was proffered by Justice Holmes. See
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New
Hall of Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in Collected Legal Papers
167, 173 (1952) (describing law more generally as "[t]he prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact").
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Court.' Although the Bush v. Gore dissenters thought the Chief
Justice accorded the Florida Supreme Court far too little defer-
ence, 3 they did not appear to disagree with the basic proposition
that a state high court that willfully disregarded the legislature's
enactments with respect to a federal election would violate the
Constitution.'
More pertinent to our purposes here, despite heated disagree-
ment on virtually every other aspect of the case, all of the Justices
in Bush v. Gore appeared to accept the proposition that, in some
circumstances, the federal courts have ultimate authority to deter-
mine whether a given proposition actually constitutes an utterance
of the state legislature. That agreement is consistent with the view
expressed in McPherson v. Blacker that a state "legislature," as
that term is used in the federal Constitution, is a particular institu-
tion.85 Significantly, McPherson was one of only two precedents
cited by the Court in its first-and unanimous-foray into the af-
termath of the 2000 presidential election.86 Presumably, had the
Florida Supreme Court explicitly stated that it ruled as it did be-
cause it thought that it and it alone was the Florida legislature, all
nine Justices would have found a constitutional problem (although
the dissenters might still have thought that any remedy lay with
Congress). Under current doctrine, therefore, it is plain that while
state constitutions typically set forth most of the existence condi-
tions for state entities, the federal Constitution contains some exis-
tence conditions that place bounds around those entities, at least
when they are performing federal functions."
Finally, note that the Constitution appears to set forth existence
conditions for federal judges themselves. We can certainly envision
531 U.S. 98, 114 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See id. at 135-43 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
See id. at 139-40 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (giving
examples of such rare willfulness).
8' 146 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1892).
6 See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000).
8' With respect to state functions, the Guaranty Clause expresses most of the rele-
vant constitutional limits. We say most rather than all because some of the prohibi-
tory language of Article I, § 10, Clause 1, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, places limits on how state offices are structured, For example,
were a state official designated the "Duke of New York" and assigned the power to
levy taxes, the prohibition on titles of nobility would probably best be read to render
the Duke's decrees without force.
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issues arising over whether a judge was properly appointed in the
first instance. Suppose that John Marshall had neglected to deliver
a commission to an Article III judge rather than a justice of the
peace. Marbury makes quite clear that had there been original ju-
risdiction in the Supreme Court, the Court would have considered
the underlying validity of the appointment. Indeed, the Court did
consider the validity of the appointment.' Together with the time-
tested proposition that courts always have jurisdiction to determine
their own jurisdiction,89 Marbury's expansive dicta support the con-
clusion that, in a lawsuit adjudicated by Judge Jones, she would be
obliged to consider her own identity as a federal judge if the issue
were raised (by a litigant or, indeed, by the judge herself). Like-
wise, in rare circumstances, a federal judge might be called upon to
decide whether she had been properly impeached.'
A state judge would also have to decide whether she is in fact a
state judge, but the relevant sources would be found primarily in
state law. Federal constitutional law would not be entirely irrele-
vant in such circumstances, however. For example, both due proc-
ess and the Article I, Section 10 bar on state bills of attainder for-
bid adjudication by a state "court" consisting of the state
legislature. Such limits, relating as they do to who counts as a state
authority, are best read as existence conditions for the utterances
of putative state authorities.
In sum, the constitutional provisions governing the selection of
Congress, the President, and federal judges, as well as scattered
' Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162 ("Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was
signed by the president, and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as
the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent
of the executive, the appointment was not revocable .... "). We pass over the ques-
tion of what procedures the Constitution requires for the appointment of lower court
judges. Article II sets forth the appointments process for "Judges of the supreme
Court," as well as "all other Officers of the United States." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. Whether lower court judges are the sort of inferior "Officers" whose appointment
need not go through Senate confirmation is a question we do not address.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 122 S. Ct. 2450, 2454 (2002) (citing United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947)) ("[I]t is familiar law that a federal
court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.").
"See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253-54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring)
(reasoning that if the Senate used a sufficiently arbitrary procedure, such as tossing a
coin, it might forfeit the protection granted to it to decide what counts as an im-
peachment trial).
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provisions limiting or assigning tasks to state institutions, set forth
existence conditions. Putative propositions of law that purport to
be actual propositions of law by virtue of having emanated from
these actors cannot be employed as such without a preliminary de-
termination that the actors in question are-so far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned-who they claim to be.
B. Mechanisms of Lawmaking
The core example of the putative statute demonstrates that Arti-
cle I, Section 7 sets forth existence conditions for legislation. If the
piece of paper that Smith calls a statute is actually a bill that passed
the House but not the Senate, or a bill that the President vetoed, or
just a piece of paper on which Smith typed words seeming to grant
him rights, then Judge Jones "enforces" Article I, Section 7 by re-
fusing to treat Smith's piece of paper as a statute.
Consider a more detailed version of the core example set forth
in the Introduction: The "Fiscal Responsibility Act" ("FRA") is a
(hypothetical) statute requiring a three-fifths majority in each
house for all subsequent measures raising taxes and declaring itself
amendable only by a three-fifths majority in each house. Let us put
aside the possibility that FRA operates as a procedural rule and as-
sume rather that it is (perhaps foolishly in light of the possibility of
procedural circumvention of Article I, Section 79) in fact a statute
91 The House of Representatives has adopted an internal rule with the effect of
FRA, except that the rule does not purport to entrench itself. See H.R. Doc. No. 107-
284, at 853 (2003) (setting forth House Rule XXI(5)(b)), available at
http://www.house.gov/rules/RXXI.htm ("A bill or joint resolution, amendment, or
conference report carrying a Federal income tax rate increase may not be considered
as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of
the Members voting, a quorum being present."). The Senate does not have such a re-
quirement, but the cloture rule-under which a three-fifths vote is necessary to break
a filibuster, S. Doc. No. 107-1, at 20-21 (2002) (setting forth Senate Rule XXII(2)),
available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.htm-operates as a de facto
equivalent. Whether the predecessor to House Rule XXI(5)(b) is constitutional has
been the subject of lively debate focusing on the scope of Congress's power to accom-
plish indirectly by rule what it cannot accomplish directly by statute. Compare Bruce
Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 Yale L.J. 1539
(1995) (arguing that the House supermajority requirement for tax measures contra-
venes Article I, § 7), with John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitu-
tionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 Yale L.J. 483
(1995) (arguing that it does not). We bracket that debate by assuming an actual stat-
ute that sets forth the supermajority requirement and that purports to entrench itself.
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purporting to set limits upon subsequent legislation. After the en-
actment of FRA, is a measure raising revenue that passes both
houses of Congress by simple majorities and receives the Presi-
dent's signature a statute?
A court asked to apply FRA (in, say, a tax evasion prosecution
of Jane Doe), must now identify which of Congress's utterances-
FRA or the measure purporting to repeal FRA-is authoritative.
The longstanding rule is that in cases of irreconcilable conflict, the
more recent utterance prevails.' This unenumerated but (until re-
cently) uncontroversial93 constitutional rule is itself an existence
condition for legislation: To qualify as a source of law, a putative
statute that is an otherwise authoritative utterance under Article I,
Section 7, and any other existence conditions the Constitution may
contain, must also not conflict with a subsequent statute. In our ex-
ample, at least the portion of FRA that purports to require a su-
permajority for its own amendment does not satisfy the existence
condition requiring that statutes not have been repealed. And the
entrenchment provision is the very heart of FRA, for without it, a
subsequent Congress could raise revenue through a simple major-
ity vote that simultaneously repealed FRA and raised revenue.
Accordingly, it appears that the basic problem with FRA is that
it contravenes the (unenumerated) constitutional existence condi-
tion stating that last-in-time legislative utterances prevail. Article I,
Section 7 does little work in this example. After all, even constitu-
tional systems with minimal judicial review-such as the English
constitution in the classic Diceyan conception-recognize that re-
pealed statutes lack binding force: The one unchangeable constitu-
tional rule in the Westminster model is that the Queen in Parlia-
92 See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) ("[S]o long as
there is no 'positive repugnancy' between two laws, a court must give effect to both."
(quoting Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 363 (1842))); Georgia v. Pa.
R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 457 (1945) ("[A] clear repugnancy between the old law and
the new results in the former giving way .. "); Town of Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S.
596, 601-02 (1883) ("[W]hen an affirmative statute contains no expression of a pur-
pose to repeal a prior law, it does not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable
conflict, or unless the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier
and is clearly intended as a substitute for it, and the intention of the legislature to re-
peal must be clear and manifest.").
" See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665 (2002).
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ment can make or unmake any law.94 Constitutionally speaking, the
Queen in Parliament cannot make a rock so heavy that she herself
cannot lift it-and neither can Congress.95
But the fact that the American and English constitutional sys-
tems share the principle that last-in-time legislation prevails does
not render Article I, Section 7 unimportant. Whether some utter-
ance really is a "statute" that repeals prior statutes depends on
whether it satisfies the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments of Article I, Section 7.
If the last-in-time principle means that courts must disregard
laws purporting to make the enactment of legislation more difficult
than under the Article I, Section 7 procedure, a different sort of
argument is needed to show that they must disregard laws purport-
ing to make the enactment of legislation easier. A congressional
grant of permission to some person or body-such as the President,
one house of Congress, the Comptroller General, nine members of
Congress, or a private industry group-to enact laws would not
violate the last-in-time principle so long as Congress retained the
power, acting pursuant to the procedures of Article I, Section 7, to
revoke the delegation. Of course, as the examples just invoked
suggest, such a grant may be held unconstitutional on other
grounds.96
' See Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
39-40 (1965) ("[T]he Queen, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons... act-
ing together [can] be ... described as the 'Queen in Parliament,' and constitute Par-
liament... Parliament thus defined has.., the right to make or unmake any law
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament."); 0. Hood Phil-
lips et al., Constitutional and Administrative Law 110-11, 476-78 (8th ed. 2001) (dis-
cussing restrictions on Westminster parliamentary sovereignty posed by international
human rights documents).
"' See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 2-3, at 125 n.1 (3d ed.
2000) ("[Tihe power of Congress legislatively to bind subsequent Congresses is lim-
ited, for any statute that purported to direct or to forbid subsequent Congresses to do
certain things or to follow certain procedures could be repealed, as could any other
law, by another duly enacted statute.").
'See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bow-
sher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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Likewise, judicial decisions construing the Appointments
Clause,97 the Take Care Clause,9 and the general doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers limit the mechanisms by which various persons or
bodies are selected and/or terminated." Such decisions read the
Constitution as setting forth existence conditions for agencies and
officials, and thus they also read the Constitution as setting forth
existence conditions for the sub-statutory law produced by these
agencies and officials: Sub-statutory law emanating from agencies
and officials whose exercise of official power violates the Constitu-
tion is invalid.
We do not take a position on the correctness of any particular
judicial decision limiting who may exercise what form of congres-
sionally delegated power. Our point is a simple one: In our legal
culture, Article I, Section 7 and other separation-of-powers provi-
sions function as limits on the mechanisms by which Congress and
other entities to whom Congress delegates power may make law. If
Congress or some other actor attempts to make law in violation of
the limits set forth in Article I, Section 7, the Appointments
Clause, the Take Care Clause, the last-in-time principle, or the
general principle of separation of powers-whatever exactly those
limits might be-that actor's pronouncements are ineffective.
If the piece of paper that plaintiff Smith waves before Judge
Jones is not a putative statute but an agency regulation that, ac-
cording to defendant Acme, is outside the agency's authority be-
cause the statute authorizing its promulgation provided the agency
with no "intelligible principle,"'" Judge Jones treats the non-
17 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9 I1d. art. II, § 3.
9 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714; Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). On the theme of constitutional ex-
istence conditions for substatutory federal law, see also Larry Alexander & Evan
Tsen Lee, Is There Such a Thing As Extraconstitutionality? The Puzzling Case of
Dalton v. Specter, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 845 (1995) (arguing that executive action exceeding
statutory authority is unconstitutional absent direct constitutional empowerment of
executive action).
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (requiring that
Congress "'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform,"' (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
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delegation doctrine as an existence condition for the regulation.
Likewise, when New York City claimed a right to funds that Con-
gress appropriated but that the President withheld pursuant to his
putative line-item-veto power, the Court treated (the judicial gloss
on) Article I, Section 7 as stating an existence condition (though it
did not use the term "existence condition").' 1 And if Congress and
the President enter into agreements with foreign sovereigns
through a mechanism other than the treaty power, the courts, if
faced with a challenge to putative laws enforcing those agreements,
would need to decide whether, as Professor Laurence Tribe argues,
the treaty-making provision of Article II, Section 2 sets forth the
exclusive mechanism by which such international agreements can
be made'" (that is, whether, in addition to satisfying the conditions
of Article I, Section 7, a piece of legislation must also, in some
sense, concern domestic affairs in order to exist as a valid law).
To be clear, we are not here interested in whether Article II,
Section 2 is best read as exclusive of agreements with foreign sov-
ereigns accomplished via the Article I, Section 7 route. We invoke
this example because it serves as a bridge to the next Section, in
which we ask whether the enumerated powers in Article I, Section
8 and elsewhere function as existence conditions. Note that if Pro-
fessor Tribe is correct and Article II, Section 2 is exclusive, then it
is not so easy to treat constitutional provisions and doctrines that
set forth the mechanisms of lawmaking-such as Article I, Section
7-as stating existence conditions while distinguishing subject-
matter limits-such as the enumerated powers provisions we dis-
cuss shortly-as stating application conditions. For under Professor
Tribe's reading of Article II, Section 2, in order to determine
whether a putative provision of law has gone through the proper
procedure for enactment, one must first determine, based on the
putative provision's subject matter, what procedure is appropriate
(and then ask whether that procedure has been followed). Indeed,
01 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 417.
Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995)
(arguing that Article II, § 2 is exclusive), with Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is
NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (arguing that the treaty power
does not exclude congressional-executive agreements as a mechanism for joint under-
takings with foreign sovereigns).
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even if Professor Tribe is incorrect, it would still be necessary to
employ that two-step process for sorting between the Article I,
Section 7 route and the Article II, Section 2 route if one were to
accept the complementary proposition that the treaty power may
only be used, as Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes put it, "for
the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs and
not to make laws for the people of the United States in their inter-
nal concerns through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making
power."' 3 And if, on either the Tribe hypothesis or the Hughes hy-
pothesis, the two-step process is appropriate for sorting between
the Article I, Section 7 route and the Article II, Section 2 route at
the border between legislation and treaty-making, then it would
seem equally appropriate for sorting between those provisions of
law that come into existence via congressional enactment and those
that must come into existence, if at all, through state lawmaking
mechanisms.
C. Subject-Matter Limits
James Madison and others of the Founding generation expected
the enumeration of powers to be the principal mechanism by which
the Constitution would limit the scope of federal authority."' That
expectation was frustrated, if not as early as McCulloch v. Mary-
land,"'5 then certainly by the middle of the twentieth century."'6
Even today, despite a much-heralded revival of federalism, as far
as subject-matter competence goes, the federal government is al-
most omnipotent. Significantly, of the recent spate of federalism
decisions, only three-United States v. Lopez, City of Boerne v.
Flores,"' and United States v. Morrison"°-find the regulation of
103 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Twenty-Third
Annual Meeting Held at Washington, D.C.-April 24-27, 1929, 23 Proc. Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. 196 (1929) (remarks of Charles Evans Hughes). Whether the treaty power
contains such a limit is unclear. See Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still
Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1726, 1732 (1998).
" 1 Annals of Cong. 437-38 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in A Second Feder-
alist 268-70 (Charles S. Hyneman & George W. Carey eds., 1967); The Federalist No.
45, at 260-61 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
l0S17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
107 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
... 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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particular categories of acts wholly beyond the power of the fed-
eral government (and even then Congress may be able to achieve
the objectives of the invalidated legislation through conditional ex-
ercises of the spending power'°9). Other recent decisions invalidat-
ing national legislation on federalism grounds limit the circum-
stances in which states can be sued".. or enforce "etiquette" rules
about how Congress may legislate on matters within its subject-
matter competence.'"1
Nonetheless, the federal government is not omnipotent. Even
the Justices who continue to adhere to the spirit and not just the
letter of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority"2 do
not take the view that there are no limits to the subjects on which
Congress may legislate-even if they would grant Congress sub-
stantial deference in the interpretation of those limits (a point to
which we return in Part III). And a majority of the Court would
clearly go further in setting limits. Lopez, Boerne, and Morrison
appear to place some activities wholly outside of congressional
control, and the sovereign immunity and "etiquette" decisions may
have that effect with respect to some activities undertaken by the
states.
Accepting that the enumerated powers limit the scope of federal
authority, do they state existence conditions or application condi-
tions? We think that if constitutional doctrine had evolved differ-
ently, a plausible case could have been made for treating such pro-
visions as application conditions, yet the actual doctrine treats
enumerated powers as existence conditions. Further, although we
do not argue the point in any detail, we think that existing doctrine
is sensible in this respect.
'09 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("[O]bjectives not
thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields,' may nevertheless be
attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds." (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936))).
"o Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Trs. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71.
" 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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How would constitutional doctrine look if the enumerated pow-
ers provisions functioned as application conditions? One can imag-
ine that when Article I, Section 8 confers on Congress the "Power
to ... regulate Commerce ... among the several States," it confers
a power to regulate specific acts of interstate commerce. On this
reading, the Commerce Clause would not state an existence condi-
tion for legislation. A putative statute would be valid so long as it
satisfied the Article I, Section 7 requirements; but such valid legis-
lation could not be applied to acts that did not themselves comprise
interstate commerce.
For example, a law banning the possession of firearms near
schoolyards could not be constitutionally applied to a person
merely possessing a homemade gun near a schoolyard, but it could
be applied consistent with the Commerce Clause (in this alterna-
tive universe) if the person charged with violating it were appre-
hended in the course of an interstate journey that brought him to a
schoolyard where he sold a firearm. Likewise, a law limiting agri-
cultural production could not be constitutionally applied to a sub-
sistence farmer, but could be applied to a factory farm that sold its
products on the interstate market. If Commerce Clause doctrine
and doctrines involving other enumerated powers functioned in
this way, the statutory provisions at work in a particular case would
be irrelevant to the question of constitutional power. The only con-
stitutional question would be whether the will of Congress was, in
the particular case, being brought to bear on an object within the
scope of the enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce.
Such an application condition could be nonenforced coherently
without creating any difficulties for a court's role in applying ordi-
nary nonconstitutional law.
In fact, however, Commerce Clause doctrine does not turn on
particular acts regulated in particular cases. Whether Congress has
acted within the scope of the Commerce Clause depends upon
whether the law Congress enacted regulates either the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or classes of economic ac-
tivities that, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce."3 This approach makes good sense. At least since Gib-
"3 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 558-68.
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bons v. Ogden,"' constitutional law has sensibly recognized that the
characterization of any particular action as an instance of "inter-
state commerce" is quite arbitrary.'5 Even if one were inclined to
roll back the scope of the Commerce Clause to cover, say, ship-
ment but not manufacturing, it would still be much easier for
courts to police the bounds of congressional power by looking to
the predicate of regulation rather than attempting to characterize
each particular act subject to regulation."6
To be sure, Congress sometimes chooses to include in its statutes
a "jurisdictional nexus"-that is, a requirement that the govern-
ment prove that the acts to which a statute is applied in a given
case themselves affect interstate commerce."7 The Court has also
expressed a willingness to uphold statutes containing such a nexus
where, absent the nexus, the statute's relation to interstate com-
merce would be doubtful."" Yet even in such cases, the constitu-
tional (existence) question is whether the statute contains a jurisdic-
tional nexus. Whether the nexus is satisfied in particular
circumstances is a distinct question about the statute's scope to be
decided only once the statute's existence has been established.
Of course, the decision by the Court to treat the presence or ab-
sence of a jurisdictional nexus as relevant to a statute's validity
(that is, existence) under the Commerce Clause may be a mistake.
Perhaps it would be better to ask, as the Lopez and Morrison dis-
senters apparently would, simply whether the category of regulated
activity, be it economic or noneconomic in character, has, in the
.,. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
11 In Gibbons, the Court recognized congressional power "to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed," id. at 196, rather than the power to govern dis-
crete acts.
116 Thus, it is not surprising to see that in the heyday of the distinction between
manufacturing and trade, the Supreme Court understood its task as judging the valid-
ity of statutes. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (concluding that
the challenged "law exceed[ed] the constitutional authority of Congress").
" For instance, it is unlawful for a felon to "possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) (emphasis added). Likewise, the
Child Support Recovery Act contains an express jurisdictional element. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 228 (2000) ("[Whoever] willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with re-
spect to a child who resides in another State [shall be liable] .... " (emphasis added)).
"8 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63; see also United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387,
390 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because of jurisdictional nexus);
United States v. McHugh, 967 F. Supp. 1279, 1281-82 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 228 because of jurisdictional nexus).
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aggregate, a substantial effect on interstate commerce."9 Or per-
haps, as suggested in Part I, the proper test for validity under the
Commerce Clause should be whether the congressional enactment
addresses a matter on which the states are unable to act individu-
ally, because of collective action problems, interstate externalities,
or similar phenomena.'20 Whichever of these tests is best, however,
each assumes that the Commerce Clause states a condition for the
validity of legislation, rather than stating a test for the validity of
the application of Congress's will to particular sets of circum-
stances. In other words, whatever disagreement there is about the
proper scope of the Commerce Clause, there is no live debate
about whether it states an existence condition or an application
condition. All agree (tacitly) that it states an existence condition.
Likewise, in applying the "congruence and proportionality" test
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has not
asked whether the remedies provided in various acts of Congress
are congruent and proportional to a constitutional violation pre-
sented by the particular facts of the cases before the Court. Sup-
pose, for example, that the plaintiff in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents2 ' or Board of Trustees v. Garrett22 had been the victim of
intentional, irrational discrimination by the State-the sort of dis-
crimination that the Supreme Court itself would recognize as un-
constitutional and for which the Court would therefore permit
Congress to provide a damages remedy against the State. It seems
obvious that the Court would nonetheless have ruled against the
plaintiff because the statute Congress in fact enacted-the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act-applied to a much wider category of State activity
without sufficient justification. Strikingly, in the actual Kimel and
Garrett cases, neither the majority nor the dissent analyzed the
... Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-61 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissent-
inf); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-17 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)."See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the Federal Commerce Power
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554, 555 (1995)
(suggesting that "when we are trying to decide whether some federal law or program
can be justified under the commerce power, we should ask ourselves the question, 'Is
there some reason the federal government must be able to do this, some reason why
we cannot leave the matter to the states?"').
.21 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
122 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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question whether the particular plaintiffs themselves were the vic-
tims of unconstitutional discrimination, but focused instead on
whether the statute Congress put through the Article I, Section 7
process satisfied (what the majority and dissent respectively re-
garded as) the constitutional test for validity (under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the view of the majority, and under
either that section or the Commerce Clause in the view of the dis-
sent). The Justices all regarded the enumerated powers as setting
forth existence conditions for legislation. '23
An important caveat exists, however, concerning the courts'
power to sever unconstitutional provisions and applications of
statutes from their constitutional provisions and applications.'24 Ex-
istence conditions that turn on the source from which or the proce-
dure by which a piece of text becomes law are immune to sever-
ability analysis. If the "Safe Workplaces Act" passed the House but
not the Senate, or was signed by the Secretary of Labor but not the
President, it is not a law, and neither is any part of it.' 5 Courts face
a different situation when confronted with existence conditions
that depend on content. The Court in Morrison apparently took for
granted that it could invalidate the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act without calling into question the
(many) other provisions of the Act that were passed along with it.'26
'23 On rare occasions, the Court has purported to measure the validity of a statute
challenged under what we would deem an existence condition "as applied." See
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997) ("[T]here is no serious doubt about
the constitutionality of [the federal bribery statute] as applied to the facts of this
case."); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1960) (apparently validating fed-
eral civil rights action on the ground that the particular conduct alleged was regulable
by Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment). In our view, this anomalous approach
at most suggests that, in addition to stating existence conditions for legislation, the
enumerated powers may also sometimes operate as application conditions for valid
statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38 (explaining that a single constitu-
tional provision can function as both an existence condition and an application condi-
tion).
124 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934-35 (1983).
Chadha is certainly no counterexample. There the Court concluded that
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act-which authorized a unicameral
legislative veto-was severable from the remainder of § 244 and the Act as a whole.
Id. The Court certainly did not hold that any putative statute adopted via the unconsti-
tutional procedure set forth in § 244(c)(2) could be severed into valid and invalid parts.
'21 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. Or consider Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, in which
the Court treated (what it read as) the grant of original jurisdiction to issue writs of
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Of course, had Congress included a nonseverability clause in the
Act, specifying that the invalidation of any provision would void
the entire Act, the Court could have enforced such a clause, but it
would have done so as a matter of nonconstitutional law. Absent
such instruction from Congress, however, there is a working as-
sumption that discrete bits of language enacted together may be
invalidated separately if the constitutional infirmity is found in the
content of only some of the statutory language.
So far, the practice of severing the unconstitutional bits of stat-
utes from the constitutional bits does not appear to pose any diffi-
culties for our conception of existence conditions. A problem arises
from the fact that courts claim a power to sever not just unconstitu-
tional statutory clauses but also unconstitutional applications. Sup-
pose again that the plaintiff in Kimel or Garrett had been the victim
of unconstitutional discrimination. One can imagine that the Court
could have written an opinion that went something like this:
The statute as written fails the congruence and proportionality
test, and therefore Congress lacked the authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, we presume that Con-
gress intends unconstitutional provisions and applications of
statutes to be severable from constitutional provisions and appli-
cations. '27 Thus, we can sever so much of the statute that provides
a damages remedy for permissible discrimination and uphold
that portion of the statute which provides a remedy for imper-
missible discrimination of the sort presented here. So truncated,
the statute satisfies the constitutional test and provides plaintiff
with a valid remedy.
If this sort of procedure were allowed without restriction, all
content-based existence conditions would function as application
conditions (except that because they would "really" be existence
conditions, they would necessarily be enforced even if one thought,
mandamus in § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a nullity without saying or implying
that the rest of the Act was invalid.
117 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934-35; Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S.
210, 234-35 (1932) ("Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted
those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."); Adler, Rights
Against Rules, supra note 35, at 145-52 (discussing partial rather than facial invalida-
tion of statutes failing constitutional tests).
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contrary to Marshall's argument in Marbury, that application con-
ditions should not be enforced). In any enumerated powers chal-
lenge, then, the Court would inquire whether (1) the text Congress
enacted applies to the regulated conduct, and (2) the regulated
conduct does in fact fall within the domain of conduct regulable by
Congress, so that Congress could have regulated the conduct under
a properly drawn statute. If (1) and (2) were satisfied, the Court
would sever (or assume the severability of) the statute to the extent
that it regulates nonregulable conduct, leaving intact a statute
regulating the conduct at issue in the particular case simply be-
cause that conduct is regulable. This result would be equivalent to
treating an enumerated power as stating a necessarily enforceable
application condition.
Although courts do claim the power to sever not just unconstitu-
tional language but also unconstitutional applications, ' this power
is rather limited in practice and so does not convert all content-
based existence conditions into necessarily enforceable application
conditions. That is the meaning, we think, of the longstanding prin-
ciple that, notwithstanding the presumption of severability, courts
will not re-write statutes in order to narrow and save them. To re-
turn to the Kimel and Garrett variations, neither the ADEA nor
the ADA as written distinguishes between rational and irrational
discrimination, and so "severing" the two categories would really
require the Court first to graft such a distinction into the statute, a
power the courts have typically disclaimed.
Moreover, some content-based constitutional tests are them-
selves inconsistent with a robust power of application severability.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine how the congruence-and-
proportionality test could be applied coherently to the "applica-
tion-severed" statute. The test asks whether the text Congress en-
acted was congruent and proportional to the record of constitu-
tional violations Congress considered. Although it is conceivable
that the Court could ask whether, by coincidence, the judicially
truncated and rewritten text is congruent and proportionate to the
record that was before Congress when it adopted the much
broader statute, such an inquiry would be inconsistent with the
spirit (and perhaps the letter) of the congruence-and-proportionality
" See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35, at 152-70.
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test, which focuses on the relation between an actual record and
the actual statute Congress enacted.'29 The same sort of relation is
demanded by the Commerce Clause test for validity.
We have thus far argued in this Section that, given how they
function in our constitutional culture, the enumerated powers are
best read as stating existence conditions and that the possibility of
severing unconstitutional provisions of statutes from constitutional
provisions does not alter that conclusion. An unfettered judicial
power to sever unconstitutional applications would convert the
enumerated powers into necessarily enforceable application condi-
tions, but the courts' power to sever unconstitutional applications
is in fact limited, and thus is consistent with the view that the enu-
merated powers are full-fledged existence conditions. As for the
other federalism provisions in the Constitution, which we shall now
briefly examine, we conclude that some such provisions function as
existence conditions while others function as application condi-
tions.
In addition to empowering the federal government, the Consti-
tution also contains federalism provisions that disempower the
states in certain respects. For example, absent congressional con-
sent, Article I, Section 10 prohibits a state from laying "any Im-
posts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws."'30 Likewise, the
affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce has long been understood to contain a "dormant" prohibi-
tion on some forms of state regulation of interstate commerce. Un-
der the modern test, the dormant commerce clause principally
prohibits discriminatory and unduly burdensome regulations of in-
terstate commerce. 3'
29For an argument that the congruence-and-proportionality test relies on a misun-
derstanding of congressional factfinding, see William W. Buzbee & Robert A.
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (2001).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1994); New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988) ("This 'negative' aspect of the Commerce
Clause prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. Thus, state
statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck
down unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to
economic protectionism." (citations omitted)).
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These provisions operate as existence conditions. For example, a
state tax that by its terms applies only to "out-of-state banks" is fa-
cially discriminatory and therefore, under the conventional ap-
proach, void. An otherwise properly enacted (under state constitu-
tional standards) provision of state law containing such a tax is not
a valid rule of law in light of the dormant commerce clause.
One might think that in other circumstances the dormant com-
merce clause functions as an application condition. Although the
precedents in this area are complex and arguably incoherent,'32 it
can be said that whatever else it does, the antidiscrimination prong
of the dormant commerce clause prohibits laws that, while neutral
on their face and arguably enacted to serve legitimate state ends,
have discriminatory effects.' In fact, one might also think that "ef-
fects" tests always function as application conditions: unconstitu-
tional effects, in this view, amount to unconstitutional applications
of otherwise valid laws. Effects tests, however, can function as exis-
tence conditions. Constitutional effects tests sometimes take the
following form: A law with the effect of X is invalid, where X may
be principally advancing religion l placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman's efforts to obtain an abortion,'35 or unduly
132 See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A]pplications of the doctrine have, not to put too fine
a point on the matter, made no sense."); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the doctrine as "hopelessly
confused"); 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-14, at 1104 (3d ed.
2000); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause:
A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 395,397-99 (1998).
"' Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654 (1994) ("[W]e repeatedly have
focused our Commerce Clause analysis on whether a challenged scheme is discrimina-
tory in 'effect'...."); id. at 653 ("[A] court need not inquire into the purpose or moti-
vation behind a law to determine that in actuality it impermissibly discriminates
against interstate commerce."); Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("A
finding that state legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the
basis of ... discriminatory effect." (citations omitted)).
" Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002) ("'The Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the "purpose" or "effect"
of advancing or inhibiting religion."' (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23
(1997))).
135 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, &
Souter, JJ., plurality) ("Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or ef-
fect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an
undue burden on the right [recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)1.").
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burdening interstate commerce.'36 The invalid effects of the law
render the law, not just the effects, unconstitutional. Each of the
aforementioned constitutional prohibitions may also state an appli-
cation condition under some circumstances, but this fact does not
preclude the possibility that effects tests can function as existence
conditions.
Constitutional provisions and doctrines can appear alternatively
as existence conditions or application conditions depending upon
the type of action to which they apply. Consider another federalism
doctrine. The anti-commandeering principle of New York v. United
States'37 and Printz v. United States"' operated, in the context of
those cases, as an existence condition. As the Court interpreted the
Tenth Amendment (and a free-floating federalism provision),
Congress may not make a law specifically directing a state legisla-
ture to adopt a particular law or a state executive official to enforce
a federal directive against a third party. Accordingly, Printz and
New York are best read to mean that the challenged provisions of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act and
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act were not valid rules
of law.
One can nonetheless imagine circumstances in which the anti-
commandeering rule would appear to function as an application
condition. Consider a hypothetical federal statute delegating au-
thority to a federal administrative agency to issue "all orders nec-
essary" to effectuate a statutory mandate that is clearly within
some subject-matter area competence of the federal government,
such as the interdiction of fissile materials moving in interstate or
foreign commerce. Suppose that the federal agency orders a state
energy regulatory commission to review power plant applications
under a more stringent standard than the state commission would
otherwise employ, and suppose further that the federal order, if
contained in a federal statute, would violate Printz. It is clear from
3' Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) ("The negative or dormant
implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation that discriminates
against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'imped[es] free private
trade in the national marketplace."' (citations omitted) (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980))).
137 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
3 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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Printz that the anti-commandeering rule, as a limit on federal
power, would apply to a federal agency no less than to Congress. In
this context, however, insofar as the federal statute is concerned,
the anti-commandeering rule operates as an application condition
rather than as an existence condition. The law delegating power to
the federal agency is valid, but the particular application of that
law is not.
The foregoing example is hardly unique. In general, where a
constitutional provision states either a subject-matter or "eti-
quette" limit on federal legislation, it will also state a similar limit
on federal administrative action. That limit then functions as an ex-
istence condition for agency output and simultaneously as an appli-
cation condition for the underlying statute. The agency output-a
rule or an order-is void, but the congressional output-the statute
authorizing the agency action-remains valid in that it continues to
authorize the agency to act when the latter does not run afoul of
the subject-matter or etiquette limit.
More broadly still, as these last examples illustrate, what appears
to be a single constitutional provision or doctrine might actually be
best understood as stating multiple constitutional rules-some of
them existence conditions and others application conditions-
depending upon the context. We return to this point in our discus-
sion of individual rights.
D. Individual Rights
Professor Ronald Dworkin famously characterized rights in
American constitutional law as "trumps" that block otherwise valid
exercises of governmental power.' 9 To the extent that Professor
Dworkin's view makes rights absolute bars to balancing and other
consequentialist calculations, it fails to capture the degree to which
constitutional rights can be overridden by a sufficiently strong
competing end." American constitutional rights are more accu-
rately described as "shields" that deflect weak and medium
139 See sources cited supra note 49.
"See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 133, 155-56 (1997) (reviewing Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 36, and
Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth (1996)).
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strength justifications but succumb to very strong ones."' Yet either
metaphor-rights as trumps or rights as shields-suggests that
rights typically function as application conditions: Each person
walks around protected by either an infinitely or merely very
strong shield that knocks out either all or most laws infringing her
protected rights.
This picture-which we think dominates the constitutional
imagination-perhaps explains why it is natural to think that con-
stitutional rights cases invariably fall within the model of the ex-
ample discussed in Part I: Widget Inc.'s objection that the Wet-
lands Preservation Act takes its property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, even though
the Act itself is valid. Many constitutional rights claims do seem to
fit this picture. However, the picture is misleading, or at least in-
complete.'42 Constitutional rights sometimes function as existence
conditions also, and, as is true of the dormant commerce clause and
the anti-commandeering principle, the same individual right some-
times functions variously as an existence condition or an applica-
tion condition. Parsing individual rights provisions and doctrines
into existence and application conditions sheds light on the distinc-
tion between facial and as-applied rights claims, and further clari-
fies what is at stake in calls to remove the courts from constitu-
tional adjudication of rights cases.
Various constitutional rights provisions operate much like the
Takings Clause in Widget's case-that is, as application conditions.
Consider the requirement drawn from the Fourth Amendment
that, absent exigent circumstances or some other exception, the po-
lice must obtain a warrant based upon probable cause in order to
support a search or seizure.'43 This constitutional doctrine con-
strains police (and arguably other official) conduct, rather than de-
fining what counts as state or federal law. Likewise, to give addi-
tional examples, the Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by a
grand jury in federal criminal prosecutions, the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial, the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury
"' See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 Ga. L. Rev.
415, 429-30 (1993).
142 See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35, at 6-12.
,' See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968).
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trial in federal cases, and the Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment all focus on what happens to
particular persons in particular situations. They do not (necessarily)
figure into a judge's identification of the law that she must apply.
This is not to say that the aforementioned constitutional provisions
could never be invoked to challenge particular laws. A law authoriz-
ing a violation of any of these provisions could be held unconstitu-
tional on that basis, but, in doing so, a court would be, in effect,
employing a time-saving device. Rather than await each unconsti-
tutional search, indictment, bench trial, and disproportionate sen-
tence to occur, a court that holds a law invalid insofar as it author-
izes unconstitutional action substitutes a wholesale remedy for a
retail one."'
Current doctrine purports to disfavor this sort of wholesale in-
validation of laws on the basis of aggregating retail violations of
application conditions. Thus, in United States v. Salerno, the Court
declared that it would only invalidate the Bail Reform Act of 1984
as inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail
Clause if there were "no set of circumstances" in which the Act
could be constitutionally applied.' 5 As each of us has argued at
some length, there are reasons to doubt both the wisdom of the
Salerno rule and its accuracy as a statement of the Court's prac-
tice.46 Yet even taking Salerno on its own terms, it should be clear
that the "no set of circumstances" rule only operates-or at least
that it should only operate-in cases in which a law (or general pol-
icy having the effect of law) is challenged as inconsistent with an
application condition. If, by contrast, the constitutional provision
invoked sets forth an existence condition, an evaluation of individ-
ual applications of the statute is irrelevant to the question whether
'" Application conditions like those discussed in the previous two paragraphs of text
might also function, in certain circumstances, as existence conditions for certain kinds
of legal utterances. For example, the failure to respect the Sixth or Seventh Amend-
ment right to jury trial might render void a judgment or decree from the resulting
bench trial (if the objection was preserved). Likewise, the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirement that a search warrant state facts giving rise to probable cause-or at least
facts that a reasonable police officer acting in good faith could think give rise to prob-
able cause, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)-might be an exis-
tence condition for the warrant.
14'481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
146 See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35, at 154-58; Dorf, Facial Chal-
lenges, supra note 35, at 236-39.
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the challenged law is valid-except to the extent that, as with the
effects tests under the Establishment Clause, the abortion deci-
sions, and the dormant commerce clause, the question whether a
putative law satisfies the relevant existence condition itself de-
pends upon the impact of the putative law.' 7
To an extent that may be surprising given the dominance of the
picture encapsulated by the Widget case, constitutional rights set
forth existence conditions. There is no constitutional right to burn
a flag,"'4 but the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment in-
validates laws targeting the communicative impact of flag-
burning."9 There is no constitutional right to use peyote in a reli-
gious ritual, but the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment invalidate laws singling out religiously moti-
vated peyote use."' No constitutional right entitles eighteen-to-
twenty-one-year-old males to purchase 3.2% beer, but a law grant-
ing that privilege to female but not male eighteen-to-twenty-one-
year-olds violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'1 In each of these examples, the relevant constitu-
tional provision operates as an existence condition, not an applica-
tion condition.
This is not to say that the relevant constitutional provisions do
not or could not also operate as application conditions in other
contexts. The First Amendment provides some (albeit weak) pro-
147 Our position is thus close to that of Professor Marc Isserles, who distinguishes
between an overbreadth challenge, "which predicates facial invalidity on some aggre-
gate number of unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid rule of law," and
"a 'valid rule facial challenge,' which predicates facial invalidity on a constitutional
defect inhering in the terms of the statute itself, independent of the statute's applica-
tion to particular cases." Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Chal-
lenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359, 363-64 (1998). How-
ever, our categories are not entirely congruent. Unlike Isserles, we do not insist that
the test for validity of a statute itself-what we term an existence condition-must
proceed without regard to a statute's applications.
148For example, an arsonist who starts a fire with a burning flag could be punished
under an arson prohibition. See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35, at 3-4
(discussing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
149 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420.
"' Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding religiously
neutral prohibition on drug use despite lack of exemption for religiously motivated
use), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (invalidating prohibition on animal sacrifice that targeted Santeria church).
"' Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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tection to particular speech-acts proscribed under content-neutral
laws that may be valid in most circumstances.'5 2 Likewise, Con-
gress, some constitutional scholars, and a minority of the current
Supreme Court Justices all take the view that the Free Exercise
Clause shields some religiously motivated conduct from regulation
under otherwise valid rules of law.15 Free-speech doctrine regard-
ing content-neutral laws and the various proposals to exempt relig-
iously motivated conduct from generally applicable laws could be
understood as stating existence conditions, with the remedy of par-
tial invalidation for those laws failing the relevant tests. Alterna-
tively, a regime of free-speech or free-exercise exemptions from
otherwise valid rules could be viewed as setting forth application
conditions.
But even assuming that the application-conditions view is cor-
rect, this would hardly negate the fact that constitutional rights also
set forth existence conditions. No one argues that the First
Amendment should be read to protect against incidental burdens
on protected conduct and not against laws that target rights. Ac-
cording to critics of the Court's free-exercise doctrine, the Free
Exercise Clause-like the dormant commerce clause and the anti-
commandeering doctrine-should be read as sometimes acting as
an application condition and at other times acting as an existence
condition. In other words, the debate in the peyote case and similar
cases is not about whether constitutional rights should ever be read
as existence conditions; it is about whether they should ever be
read as anything more than existence conditions.
Consider three arguments for viewing particular rights as exclu-
sively providing protection against rules rather than also shielding
conduct. First, the majority in Employment Division v. Smith'4 ad-
Nominally, intermediate scrutiny applies to such laws, but in practice the Su-
preme Court applies a more deferential approach. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175, 1200-10 (1996) [hereinafter
Dorf, Incidental Burdens].
"' After a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that there was no such constitu-
tional protection, Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, Congress disagreed and enacted the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993-invalidated in Flores, 521 U.S. 507-to
override Smith. For academic criticism of the Smith decision, see, for example, Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1109 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 195, 215-19 (1992).
"" 494 U.S. at 877-82.
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vances the claim, traceable in one form to Professor Friedrich
Hayek,'55 that a commitment to the rule of law does not permit
judges (or other officials) to make rights-based exceptions to oth-
erwise valid general laws. Second, it can be argued that widely
shared and deeply rooted understandings of liberty and equality
are best implemented by constitutional doctrine that conceptual-
izes judges' activity in protecting (most) rights as the repeal or revi-
sion of constitutionally defective rules. 56 Finally, particular consti-
tutional language draws attention to laws rather than applications:
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed";
57
"Congress shall make no law" establishing religion, prohibiting
free exercise, or abridging freedom of speech, the press, or assem-
bly.'8 If this last point counts in favor of treating these provisions as
existence conditions, however, then by negative implication, it
counts against treating provisions containing no similar language as
existence conditions.
Were we to enter the debate over whether constitutional rights
should ever be read as stating application conditions, we would ar-
gue that they sometimes should be so read. 9 But we do not mean
here to take a position on which rights-conferring constitutional
provisions and doctrines are best read as existence conditions,
which are best read as application conditions, and which are best
1 See Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 Legal Theory 269, 295-96
(2000) [hereinafter Dorf, Heterogeneity of Rights] (discussing a view set forth in
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 148-61 (1960)).
116 See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35.
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
8Id. amend. I.
15Michael C. Dorf, God and Man in the Yale Dormitories, 84 Va. L. Rev. 843
(1998); see Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 152. The statement in the text is, per-
haps despite appearances, consistent with the prior work of both authors. In "The
Heterogeneity of Rights," supra note 141, at 270, Dorf took aim at the following state-
ment in Adler's "Rights Against Rules": "Constitutional rights in our own legal world
are structured, not as shields around particular actions, but as shields against
particular rules." Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 35, at 13. Dorf disagreed
with Adler's statement to the extent that it implied that all constitutional rights are or
should be rule-dependent. However, as Adler then made clear, his was an argument
about how to understand, and what implications to draw from, the wide range of con-
stitutional rights that are in fact rule-dependent; he was not claiming that all constitu-
tional rights are or should be rule-dependent. See Adler, Personal Rights, supra note
35, at 344 (describing the "Rule-Dependence Thesis... as the thesis that some consti-
tutional scenarios are rule-dependent").
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read as existence conditions in some circumstances and application
conditions in others. Our point is simply that, despite what one
might think based upon the picture conveyed by the Widget case,
constitutional rights do not invariably take the form of application
conditions; rather, they frequently take the form of existence con-
ditions.
Putting aside the picture conveyed by the Widget hypothetical
would result in a view of rights closer to the one that was widely
held at the Founding. The drafters of the Constitution had, as their
principal aim, the strengthening of the federal government, yet
they also sought to limit the newly strengthened government so
that it would not threaten their "rights." We use quotation marks
here to connote a certain fuzziness about the way the Founding
generation conceptualized rights. For one thing, the term "right"
was frequently used indiscriminately to refer to the protection of
individuals, states, and other collective entities."6 This particular
fuzziness has been a source of consternation for scholars, lawyers,
and judges trying to make sense of the Second Amendment."'
Nor did the Founding generation think it especially important to
define particular rights, as the Federalists' initial opposition to a
Bill of Rights reveals. Hamilton, Madison, and other leading Fed-
eralists erroneously believed that the Constitution's failure to grant
to Congress the power to infringe specific liberties, such as the
freedom of speech, was sufficient to protect those liberties. 62 They
" See Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 85 (1999) ("Bearers of
rights [at the Founding] included legislatures, governments, cities, colonies, countries,
specific communities, and 'the people' as a collective entity distinct from individu-
als.").
.61 Compare Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
the "collective rights model ... provides the best interpretation of the Second
Amendment"), with United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218-29 (5th Cir. 2001)
(reaching the opposite conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individ-
ual's right to keep and bear arms).
162 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("[W]hy declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to
do?"); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in The Ori-
gins of the American Constitution 367, 369 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) (expressing
Madison's view that the omission of a Bill of Rights was unimportant because, among
other things, "the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal
powers are granted"); James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct.
6, 1787), in Federalists and Antifederalists: The Debate Over the Ratification of the
Constitution 166, 167 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 2d ed. 1998) ("[I]t
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seem to have overlooked the possibility that a measure-such as
the prohibition of interstate sales of newspapers critical of the gov-
ernment-could fall within a general power but nonetheless in-
fringe a right.
1 63
The Framers' seemingly sloppy thinking about rights is also re-
flected in the language of the Bill of Rights that was ultimately
adopted. The First Amendment takes the form of a prohibition on
lawmaking by Congress, but other provisions establish (or recog-
nize) "rights." The Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments
refer to "the people,"'" whereas the Fifth Amendment (twice) re-
fers to what the government may not do to any "person.' 65 Are
these distinctions important? A sufficiently ingenious and hard-
working constitutional archeologist such as Professor Akhil Amar
can find hidden meanings in these particular word choices, '66
thereby posing an interesting question about the extent to which
constitutional interpreters should strive for what Professor Chris-
topher Eisgruber (pejoratively) terms "aesthetic" value in trying to
make the greatest sense of textual intricacies.167 Putting that debate
to one side, however, it should be emphasized that the phrasing of
the original Constitution and Bill of Rights may appear to contem-
porary readers as haphazard or Delphic because most of us tend to
view the document through the lens of modern conceptions of
rights. To members of the Founding generation, it was natural to
use the term "rights" somewhat loosely because they viewed the
recitation of rights and the enumeration of powers as mutually re-
would have been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a federal body of our
own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested ei-
ther by the intention or the act, that has brought that body into existence.").
6' See Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 152, at 1190-92. We use "seem" here,
however, because the original Constitution did, of course, contain provisions in Arti-
cle I, § 9 that only make sense on the assumption that a general grant of power can be
used to infringe a right: The affirmative powers nowhere expressly authorize Con-
gress to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to enact ex post facto
laws or bills of attainder, yet the Constitution still prohibits these practices. See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cls. 2-3.
16 U.S. Const. amends. II, IV, IX, X.
65Id. amend. V.
166 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999). But see
Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble
with Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730 (2000).
67 Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitu-
tional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611, 1617 (1997)..
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inforcing checks that served the interest of limiting the reach of
government.'6" They frequently viewed rights-no less than pow-
ers-as expressing limits on the sorts of laws that Congress could
enact, that is, as setting forth existence conditions.
To summarize, notwithstanding what may appear to be the
paradigmatic nature of the Widget case, the circumstances in which
courts are asked to adjudicate rights claims frequently require
them to treat the relevant rights provision or doctrine as setting
forth an existence condition. We conclude this Section with two
further observations.
First, observe an apparent irony. From the perspective of de-
mocratic theory, judicial enforcement of a constitution poses the
fewest problems when the courts invoke the constitution to block
administrative as opposed to legislative action.9 Even the English
legal system in the heyday of parliamentary supremacy recognized
an ultra vires doctrine, and judicial review skeptics, such as Profes-
sor Jeremy Waldron, seem more comfortable with the concept of
judicial enforcement of constitutional limits against executive and
administrative action.'70 Yet our analysis suggests that courts can
more readily justify nonenforcement of constitutional limits on ex-
ecutive and administrative action than of legislative action-for
constitutional limits on the former will frequently take the form of
application conditions with respect to the underlying statutes, '
whereas limits on decisions taken by the legislature typically go to
the validity of the legislation, and are thus existence conditions.
The irony dissolves, however, when one recalls that the same con-
stitutional provision may function simultaneously as an application
'68See Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in The
Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment 1,
14-19 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
69 See Adler, Judicial Restraint, supra note 45, at 764-71; cf. Henry P. Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1983) (noting the need
for judicial review of agency decisionmaking to prevent the constitutional scheme
from going "seriously awry").
70 See Waldron, supra note 7.
... This may not always be true. Consitutional limits on executive and administrative
actions sometimes take the form of freestanding existence conditions that do not, ap-
parently, function as application conditions for statutes. For example, various doc-
trines drawn from § 7 of Article I, the Take Care Clause, the Appointments Clause,
and the general principle of separation of powers (discussed above in Section II.B) set
forth existence conditions for administrative bodies themselves.
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condition with respect to legislation authorizing administrative ac-
tion and as an existence condition with respect to the administra-
tive action itself. As an example, the Printz anti-commandeering
rule functions as an application condition with respect to a (barely
hypothetical) statute authorizing the Justice Department to "inves-
tigate allegations of terrorism" when the Department attempts to
implement the statute by ordering state law enforcement officials
to question men of Middle Eastern origin, but Printz functions as
an existence condition for the Department's order itself. More
generally, where existence conditions render agency output void,
the conscientious judge truly has no choice but to enforce such
conditions. In other words, this account does not make the en-
forcement of constitutional limits on agency action more "op-
tional" than the enforcement of similar limits on legislation.
Second, our analysis narrows the scope of legitimate disagree-
ment about when courts should strike down legislation on its face.
A court faced with a rights (or other) challenge based on an exis-
tence condition has no occasion to apply the Salerno test. A suc-
cessful challenge based on an existence condition will mean that
the Salerno test for unconstitutionality is automatically satisfied: A
putative law that is not in fact valid-that is, in the traditional for-
mulation, a nullity-cannot be constitutionally applied under any
set of circumstances.172
Accordingly, it should be uncontroversial that courts must-
absent epistemic and related considerations and subject to sever-
ance for some constitutional tests-facially invalidate laws that fail
existence conditions. The debate about facial-versus-as-applied liti-
gation should focus on the question of the circumstances in which
courts can facially invalidate laws for failing to satisfy application
conditions. That debate, as one of us has argued at length
elsewhere is best understood as turning on questions of severabil-
ity.1
73
172 See Dorf, Heterogeneity of Rights, supra note 155, at 286 ("For example, in some
separation-of-powers cases, the very existence of a rule- or policy-making body will be
deemed unconstitutional, thus rendering all of its actions invalid.").
173 See Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 35, at 249-51 (arguing that the proper
evaluation of a facial challenge turns on whether constitutional principles override the
presumption that invalid provisions and applications of laws are severable from valid
provisions and applications); Dorf, Heterogeneity of Rights, supra note 155, at 279
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Whether to permit severability is principally a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, but the inquiry may also be constrained by con-
stitutional factors.174 To the extent that one concludes that the Con-
stitution itself forbids severability (that is, requires facial
invalidation) as a remedy for some aggregation of unconstitutional
applications-as in the standard view of the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine-the application condition has been trans-
formed into an existence condition as well. Regarding this sort of
doctrine, we would say that one existence condition for laws sub-
ject to the overbreadth doctrine is that such laws not admit of too
many unconstitutional applications."7 In short, as demonstrated in
the previous Section, the possibility that courts may sever valid
from invalid clauses and some applications of laws can, in certain
contexts, blur the distinction between existence and application
conditions. 6
Notwithstanding the possibility of such blurring, the distinction
between existence conditions and application conditions remains
serviceably clear-and important. We turn next to the question of
how to make sense of doctrines, like the enrolled bill doctrine, the
political question doctrine, and rational basis review, that appear to
underenforce or entirely fail to enforce what we have argued are
existence conditions that the courts must necessarily fully enforce.
(arguing "that understanding the facial challenges debate as a debate about when
courts may sever portions and applications of statutes would clarify the real stakes").
"' See Dorf, Heterogeneity of Rights, supra note 155, at 281-90; Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
1321, 1351 (2000) ("[L]imits on severability are aspects of the particular constitutional
tests developed by the Supreme Court to enforce specific constitutional provi-
sions .... ).
,"' Professor Henry Monaghan's important article on the subject expressed a some-
what different view of how the overbreadth doctrine functions as an existence condi-
tion. He argued that the doctrine could be explained as a consequence of the constitu-
tional rule that strict scrutiny-a requirement that the law's effects closely match a
compelling interest-applies to laws abridging First Amendment freedoms. See
Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 36-39. Although we do
not fully agree with Professor Monaghan's approach, see Dorf, Facial Challenges, su-
pra note 35, at 243-44 & 243 n.29, his core insight retains much explanatory force.
76 See Dorf, Heterogeneity of Rights, supra note 155, at 286 ("[S]everability can
blur the distinction between, on the one hand, overbreadth and related doctrines, and,
on the other, valid-rule facial challenges.").
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III. UNDERENFORCEMENT OF EXISTENCE CONDITIONS
In Part I, we argued that a constitutional existence condition is
necessarily fully enforced by a legally conscientious court, insofar
as the type of law whose existence hinges on the condition is legally
relevant to the court's decision. In Part II, we argued that a wide
range of constitutional provisions are existence conditions for fed-
eral and, to a lesser extent, state law. We now consider and defuse
some apparent counterexamples to our claims: judicial devices such
as the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the "political question" doctrine,
"rational basis" review, and others by which courts seemingly un-
derenforce existence conditions.
A. Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The "enrolled bill" doctrine ("EB"), announced by the Court in
the 1892 case of Field v. Clark77 and still good law, presents the
starkest challenge to our claims-for EB apparently requires the
underenforcement of Article I, Section 7 itself, the clearest case of
a constitutional existence condition. In Field, an administrative
agency had imposed duties on various importers pursuant to the
Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, as set forth in the enrolled bill: the
document signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate, which each asserts to have been approved by his re-
spective house, and which is forwarded to the President for his sig-
nature and thence to statutory archives kept by the Secretary of
State. 8 It is from these archives that the Statutes at Large are, in
turn, copied. The importers challenged the assessed duties, claim-
ing that the "Tariff Act" on which the agency had relied was not
law because the Congressional Record and House and Senate
committee reports demonstrated that its language differed from
the bill actually passed by Congress. The Supreme Court rejected
this claim. It held that the "enrolled bill" is conclusive evidence of
the content of a statute, that courts may not look to the Congres-
sional Record or other extrinsic evidence tending to show that
'..143 U.S. 649 (1892); see also United States Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents, 508
U.S. 439, 455 n.7 (1993) (limiting Field but not questioning its applicability within lim-
ited domain); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990) (same).7' Field, 143 U.S. at 667-68.
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some other statutory language was what Congress really enacted.
The Court stated:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two houses .... through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill ... has received, in
due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the govern-
ment .... And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval,
and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unim-
peachable .... The respect due to coequal and independent de-
partments requires the judicial department to... accept, as hav-
ing passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated:
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.'79
A document is not a statute unless it has "passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate," in accordance with Article I, Sec-
tion 7, Clause 2. "Passage" is standardly understood to mean being
approved by a majority of a quorum of each house.'80 The Constitu-
tion explicitly states that a majority of a house makes a quorum; it
does not state explicitly that "passage" equals approval by a major-
ity of the quorum, and there may be some interpretive flexibility
there. But that flexibility is not so great as to mean that a docu-
ment approved only by the Speaker of the House and President of
the Senate, each with a quorum present, has "passed" Congress for
constitutional purposes and is therefore a full-fledged statute once
signed by the President. The Court in Field did not gainsay this
point; it did not offer a radically minimal reading of constitutional
bicameralism: "There is no authority in the presiding officers of the
House of Representatives and the Senate to attest by their signa-
179 Id. at 672.
80 See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892) ("[T]he general rule of all
parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the
quorum is the act of the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in
any given case the terms of the organic act under which the body is assembled have
prescribed specific limitations .... No such limitation is found in the Federal Consti-
tution, and therefore the general law of such bodies obtains.").
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tures ... any bill not passed by Congress. ' '81 What, then, justifies
EB?
Let us bracket, for now, two possible justifications for EB and
other supposed underenforcement doctrines. The first invokes the
hierarchical authority of the Supreme Court. On this view, the
Court functions in effect as a constitutional legislator vis-A-vis the
lower federal courts. The Court announces doctrines that "imple-
ment" constitutional provisions, including existence conditions; the
lower courts apply these doctrines, not the underlying constitu-
tional provisions, in determining whether various types of laws ex-
ist and in resolving other constitutional issues that arise in adjudi-
cation. If this picture of the Supreme Court's role is correct,' 8 and
if the Supreme Court can take account of administrative costs, er-
ror costs, transparency, settlement, and other such "institutional"
considerations in shaping constitutional doctrine, then we have a
ready explanation for EB. By "institutional" considerations, we
mean the various considerations that (as a general normative or
moral matter) weigh against nondeferential judicial enforcement of
constitutional norms-the sorts of considerations cited by Profes-
sors Mark Tushnet, Paul Brest, Lawrence Sager, and other schol-
arly proponents of underenforcement.'83 To quote the Court in
Field once more:
The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle
that an enrolled act.., is conclusive evidence that it was passed
by Congress, according to the forms of the Constitution, would
be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule mak-
ing the validity of congressional enactments depend upon the
.8. Field, 143 U.S. at 669.
Explaining the source and nature of lower courts' obligation to follow Supreme
Court precedent rather than their own best judgment about what the Constitution
and other sources of law require turns out to be more difficult than one at first might
think. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking As-
pects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1994) (asking whether
"inferior courts [should] consider themselves constrained only by prior superior court
rulings.., or [whether] inferior courts [should] consider the implications of predict-
able future superior court rulings as well"); Dorf, Prediction, supra note 81 (critiquing
a prediction-based theory of lower court decisionmaking).
,8 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 54-71; Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 588-99 (1975); Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1217-28 (1978).
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manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept
by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keeping
them."
Absent EB, litigation costs would rise, as courts look to legislative
journals to determine what texts were really enacted; courts would
sometimes mistakenly credit the journal rather than the enrolled bill;
a judicial practice of looking to journals would give legislators an in-
centive to insert into those records provisions that were not really
passed by Congress, and Congress would have to put in place costly
procedural "countermeasures" to prevent this kind of fabrication; and
looking to journals would also increase uncertainty among the popula-
tion as to the content of the law. On a certain controversial view of the
Supreme Court's role, these sorts of prudential factors license the
Court to create general doctrines that deviate from the underlying
constitutional provisions-for example, to establish EB as doctrine
even though a text is not really a statute unless passed by a majority of
a quorum of each house. For now, however, let us consider whether
EB can be justified in more mundane terms.
A second possible justification for EB, which we shall also
bracket for now, points to Congress's power to structure adjudica-
tion. In general, Congress has the power to define and limit the
types of nonconstitutional law that federal judges may consider."'
Imagine that Congress writes the following provision into the Judi-
ciary Act:
(1) Federal courts shall consider claims and defenses arising un-
der federal "shmatutes," as well as claims and defenses arising
under federal statutes, other sources of federal law, and state
law.
(2) A "shmatute" is a document approved by the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House, and signed by the Presi-
dent.
""4Field, 143 U.S. at 673.
,8" Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953).
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(3) "Shmatutes" shall be on a par with statutes. Common law
rules, agency regulations, and all other law is trumped by
"shmatutes," just as by statutes. Further, a later "shmatute"
trumps an earlier statute (or an earlier "shmatute").
The general idea here is that, given some type of law hinging on
some constitutional existence condition, Congress can provide for
(and make relevant to adjudication) some novel type of law lacking
that existence condition. As an explanation of EB, this strategy
probably fails: INS v. Chadha and other such separation-of-powers
cases 186 make clear that Congress could not empower the Speaker
and Senate President to create nonstatutory law ("shmatutes"), let
alone give this novel kind of law parity with statutory law. In other
contexts, however, the "congressional control" strategy for explain-
ing underenforcement may be plausible.
Placing to one side this strategy and also the notion of the Court
as constitutional legislator, is there any satisfying explanation for
EB? To focus the issue, imagine a federal district court, operating
under a provision of the Judiciary Act obliging it to hear "those
and only those claims that arise under federal statutes," and adju-
dicating in a pre-Field world in which the Court has neither
adopted nor negated EB and no Supreme Court doctrine is on
point. Smith sues Acme, claiming a violation of the toxics provision
of the "Safe Workplaces Act" and appending a copy of the en-
rolled bill to his complaint. Acme answers, citing the Congressional
Record and claiming that the toxics provision was not in the ver-
sion of the Act passed by Congress. Should the court follow EB
(not qua Supreme Court doctrine, but qua its own understanding
of the Constitution), ignore Acme's evidence, and determine that
the toxics provision is really part of the Act?
One possible justification for EB, in this posture, is epistemic.
The district court (1) believes that a text must be approved by a
majority of a quorum of each house (and signed by the President)
to be a statute, and (2) believes that the Speaker of the House and
Senate President are robust experts as to what their respective
houses have approved. A robust expert on some matter is someone
whose statements are conclusive (or to use the terminology popu-
,6 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
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lar among some philosophers, "exclusionary") even in the face of
contrary evidence.187 Whenever a trained astronomer, in apparently
full possession of her faculties, points to some star and tells you its
name, you might rationally believe her, even if based on testimo-
nial evidence from non-astronomers or on your own research you
would otherwise believe its name is different. Similarly, it might (in
many situations) be epistemically reasonable for judges to take the
presiding officers of legislative bodies as robust experts with re-
spect to the content of laws promulgated by those bodies. A judge
who follows the views of someone she takes to be a robust expert
as to the content of some law is not "underenforcing" existence
conditions for that law; rather, her beliefs about the satisfaction of
those conditions track the statements of the robust experts, and she
is sensitive to her beliefs thus derived.
The problem with this epistemic account of EB is that it has lim-
ited range. The district judge acts reasonably in taking the Speaker
of the House and Senate President as robust experts only if (the
judge believes that) their epistemic capacities are unimpaired in
various ways. If the astronomer is obviously drunk, or "identifying"
the star in a context where it is unreasonable to believe him sincere
(on April Fools' Day, with lots of winks and smiles), then his iden-
tification is not reasonably taken as conclusive evidence of the
name. The same is true for the legislative leaders. If Acme alleges
in its answer that the Speaker is one hundred years old and has
Alzheimer's disease, or that he has been blackmailed by the Work-
ers' Party into enrolling the toxics provision despite nonpassage by
the House, the district court fully enforcing the standard, majori-
tarian understanding of Article I, Section 7 should take evidence as
to the truth of these expertise-defeating allegations and-if con-
vinced-should depart from EB and look to the Congressional Re-
cord or other evidence to determine what version of the Safe
Workplaces Act really passed Congress. But EB precludes this:
Neither EB in the form announced by Field, nor in the form reaf-
firmed by the modern Court, contains exceptions for incapacity, in-
187 See Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 995, 1001-18 (1989) (providing an account of law's au-
thority that involves second-order reasons for belief).
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sincerity, corruption, or other epistemic failures on the part of the
enrolling officers.
Would anything warrant the district court in following EB in this
situation, where the epistemic justification runs out? As already
mentioned, existence conditions might be perspectival. 8 This ac-
count of EB and, more generally, of putative underenforcement
does not invoke the controversial notion of the Court as constitu-
tional legislator, nor does it invoke congressional control of adjudi-
cation, that is, it applies to existence conditions for categories of
laws that Congress has required or permitted to play a role in ad-
judication; and it is quite distinct from the epistemic account. The
idea is that the content of some constitutional norm, from the per-
spective of one actor, might be different from its content viewed
from another perspective. Specifically, what Article I, Section 7
means for members of Congress might be different from what it
means for courts and other noncongressional actors. Arguably, (1)
the Constitution tells legislators, including the Speaker of the
House and Senate President, that a text must be enacted by a ma-
jority of a quorum in each house to be ripe for presidential signa-
ture and thereby statutory existence; and (2) the Constitution tells
noncongressional actors that a text must be enrolled by the
Speaker of the House and Senate President to be ripe for presiden-
tial signature and thereby statutory existence. To put the idea an-
other way, the Constitution might both articulate certain existence
conditions and make the determinations of certain official actors
(here, the legislative officers) authoritative for all other actors
(here, the courts and others) as to whether those conditions have
been satisfied.
As we shall explain in a moment, the perspectival conception of
constitutional norms provides an attractive interpretation of the
"political question" doctrine: Genuine "political questions" are just
questions of constitutional law where the norms are perspectival
and, in particular, make certain nonjudicial actors authoritative vis-
A-vis the courts. Whether perspectivalism explains EB is less clear.
The issue is simply one of constitutional interpretation: Given the
text, original understanding, constitutional structure, underlying
purposes, and other relevant interpretive sources, is Article I, Sec-
" See supra pp. 1126-27.
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tion 7 best interpreted to make the presiding legislative officers au-
thoritative, for courts, as to the content of the bills that have
"passed" each house? The text itself does not exude the deference
of, say, Article I, Section 5, which provides: "Each House shall be
the Judge of the... Qualifications of its own Members.... , The
Court in Powell v. McCormack agreed that this language would
make Congress authoritative as to whether a member possessed
the age, citizenship, and residency qualifications set forth earlier in
the Constitution. 9 Nor does Article I, Section 7 seem to call for
the deference entailed by Article I, Section 3, which states: "The
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.'.'. The
Court in Nixon v. United States relied on that language in holding
the form of the impeachment trial to be a political question. In-
deed, the relevant text of Article I seems no more "perspectival"
than the language of the Origination Clause. The former provides:
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President . .. ."'9 The latter states: "All Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives. ... "" The assur-
ance by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President that a
law originated in the House or is not a revenue-raising measure,
does not bind the courts on those issues;'9' why should their assur-
ance as to "passage" be treated differently? Perhaps one should
read the Bicameralism Clause " in conjunction with Article I, Sec-
tion 5's authorization for "Each House [to] determine the Rules of
its Proceedings.""7 But the seeming thrust of this last provision is to
make Congress acting as a body authoritative (within limits) as to
the procedural framework for legislation, not to make individual
legislative officers authoritative as to the application of that
framework.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
'9' U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
"' 506 U.S. 224 (1993). For a discussion of the Nixon case, see infra notes 208-15
and accompanying text.
'93 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
4 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
,' United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990).
' U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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The "perspectival" reading of Article I, Section 7 would require
a district court to follow EB even in cases where the court did not
believe EB to be epistemically warranted-even in cases where the
court believed the presiding officers to have lost their status as
statutory experts. In effect, the "perspectival" reading injects some
or all of the institutional considerations referenced by the Field
Court (litigation costs, error costs, incentive considerations, popu-
lar uncertainty, and the like) 9' into the meaning of Article I, Sec-
tion 7. Those considerations, in turn, would support a rigid EB rule
extending even to the (occasional) cases of impaired presiding offi-
cers. Conversely, if the Constitution's text and other interpretive
sources do not support this reading, then a district court required
to take account of "statutes" (and unconstrained by Supreme
Court doctrine) would properly depart from EB and consult other
evidence of statutory existence and content in cases where the
court believed the Speaker of the House or Senate President to be
epistemically impaired.
In short, our argument may well imply that EB should be lim-
ited-that the sweeping rule of Field is too broad. Indeed, if the
only basis for EB is epistemic, then there does not really need to be
an EB doctrine: Field should be overruled and the courts permitted
to consider all relevant evidence in determining compliance with
Article I, Section 7, including the (normally conclusive) evidence
provided by the enrolled bill. This conclusion would hardly be a
reductio of our view, however. Before Field, in Gardner v. Collec-
tor, the Court took a very different view of the admissibility of
journal evidence and the like in determining statutory content:
We are of opinion.., that whenever a question arises in a court
of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute
took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who
are called upon to decide it, have a right to resort to any source
of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the
judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question;
always seeking first for that which in its nature is most appropri-
ate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule. '"
9 See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
19973 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499, 511 (1867).
[Vol. 89:11051180
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United States v. Ballin, a companion case to Field, affirmed EB but
also cited the just-quoted language from Gardner and ultimately
looked beyond the enrolled bill, to the Congressional Record, to
determine the presence of a quorum in the House.2° Much more
recently, in United States v. Munoz-Flores, the Court declined to
apply EB in the context of an Origination Clause challenge."" In ef-
fect, Munoz-Flores limits EB to the bicameralism provision, rather
than other existence conditions or other constitutional norms.
Some state supreme courts have gone even further-permitting
courts to look to legislative journals or all relevant evidence when
any questions are raised about the existence of state statutes.2
In sum, Field implicitly adopts a perspectival account of Article
I, Section 7 which is difficult to square with the constitutional text
and other sources of constitutional meaning. EB is nonetheless
consistent with our claim that this provision states an existence
condition, if EB is understood as granting merely epistemic defer-
ence. This epistemic view of EB would require that Field be modi-
fied-to make clear that EB states an evidentiary presumption, but
one that is nonetheless rebuttable by certain kinds of evidence in
certain circumstances.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
Why have a political question doctrine ("PQ")? What distinctive
conceptual space does such a doctrine fill? There are a range of an-
swers to these questions, two of which are quite extreme. One such
extreme answer was popularized by Professor Louis Henkin: There
is no political question doctrine. 3 A "political question" holding is
nothing other than a judicial determination, on the merits, that
some choice by a nonjudicial actor is constitutionally valid or un-
constrained'4 The other extreme view was popularized by Profes-
20 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
20 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
... See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 797, 816-23
(1987).
203 Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597 (1976).
204 See id. at 601-02 (arguing that in the cases in which the Court has been thought
to treat some issue as a political question, it should be read as having said that "[t]he
act complained of violates no constitutional limitation . . . , either because the Consti-
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sor Alexander Bickel and is partly reflected in the Baker v. Carr"5
test: A "political question" holding is a judicial determination that
prudence bars the court from reaching the merits of a constitu-
tional challenge to a choice by a nonjudicial actor that (were the
court to consider the merits) the court might properly determine to
be unconstitutional. 6 For Bickel and others, 7 PQ is an especially
clear and pure example of judicial "underenforcement" of constitu-
tional norms.
We reject both of these extreme views. Where the constitutional
norms are existence conditions, the Bickelian view of PQ is unten-
able. The Henkinian view, in contrast, is dogmatic. If the Constitu-
tion is best interpreted as (1) articulating certain norms (existence
conditions or others) and (2) instructing the courts to take the de-
terminations of certain nonjudicial actors as authoritative with re-
spect to those norms, then a special constitutional framework for
adjudication emerges which is different from the case where non-
judicial choice is unconstrained, and different again from the stan-
dard case where nonjudicial choice is constrained and nonjudicial
actors lack special authority vis-A-vis courts as to the interpretation
of the constraints. Nothing in the concept of a constitution, or in a
general practice of judicial review, or in any standard view of con-
stitutional interpretation (textualism, originalism, nontextualism,
and so forth) precludes this special structure. Where it obtains-
and only there-does a genuine political question arise.
Note that our conception of PQ involves the full enforcement of
constitutional norms. Consider the Nixon case."0 Judge Nixon chal-
lenged his impeachment, claiming that it was void because his trial
was conducted in front of a committee rather than the full Senate.
The Court found a political question. On our view, Nixon was
rightly decided as a PQ case if and only if the relevant constitu-
tution imposes no relevant limitations, or because the action is amply within the limits
prescribed").
20 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26 See Bickel, supra note 2, at 70-71. But see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review,
64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1964) (criticizing Bickel's approach as unprincipled).
2. E.g., Sager, supra note 183, at 1224-28; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain
Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410,
429 n.20 (1993).20 Nixon 506 U.S. at 224.
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tional provisions, particularly Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 ("The
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments"2"), both
constrain (or at least might constrain) the process by which the
Senate issues a judgment of impeachment and make the Senate au-
thoritative as to the content of these constraints. If that is indeed
the correct reading of the Impeachment Clause, then the Nixon
Court fully enforced it. Thus read, the Clause addresses to the
courts a genuine existence condition for a judgment of impeach-
ment, one that has the interesting form of making reference to the
determinations of some other body (in this case the Senate). Only
if the Senate has purported to impeach some official and (at least
implicitly) to find compliance with the "trial" requirement in Arti-
cle I, Section 3, Clause 6 has the official really been impeached
from a judicial perspective. The Court was fully sensitive to its be-
liefs about this "perspectival" condition: Had it believed that the
"Senate" impeaching Nixon was an anti-Nixon cabal rather than
the grouping of real Senators comprising the real Senate, or that
the Senate document removing Nixon from office did not use the
words impeachment at all and was an ordinary Senate resolution,
or that this document did not purport to have been enacted by two-
thirds of a Senate quorum, it would not have found a political ques-
tion."'
Our view of PQ is nicely articulated by Justice White in his
Nixon concurrence:
209 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
210 In addition, Justices White and Souter would not have found a political question
if the Senate procedure was so arbitrary as not to fall within any reasonable under-
standing of the word "try." See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 250 (White, J., concurring) (indicat-
ing that the Senate was obliged to follow "a set of minimal procedures"); id. at 253
(Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that "more searching review of impeachment pro-
ceedings" would be warranted "[i]f the Senate were to act in a manner seriously
threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss"). Although
Justice Souter invoked Bickel for his view, id. (Souter, J., concurring), we find nothing
in the White or Souter position inconsistent with our perspectival account of PQ. Just
as the Court must satisfy itself that the body purporting to impeach a judge is, in fact,
the Senate before accepting that body's impeachment determination, so the Court
might need to first satisfy itself that the Senate procedures are not so arbitrary as to
fall outside the range of arguable "trials" before accepting both the Senate's choice of
procedures within that range and the outcome of those procedures. The "trial" condi-
tion would then function as a political question with respect to congressional determi-
nations within that range.
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[T]he issue in the political question doctrine is not whether the
constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a particu-
lar governmental function to one of the political branches. There
are numerous instances of this sort of textual commitment, e.g.,
Art. I, § 8, and it is not thought that disputes implicating these
provisions are nonjusticiable. Rather, the issue is whether the
Constitution has given one of the political branches final respon-
sibility for interpreting the scope and nature of such a power."'
This view is also reflected in the first of Baker's multiple factors: "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department."2 '2 We would modify this descrip-
tion somewhat by dropping the adverb "textually": Our view of PQ
does not entail an interpretive view that gives high priority to the
text. For example, a structuralist, intentionalist, or moralist about
interpretation could conclude that the Constitution on some issue
is best understood to make certain nonjudicial determinations
binding on the courts.
Ironically, the full Baker test, which contemplates PQ rulings on
various grounds that have only a tenuous link to the content of
constitutional law, better fits with the pre-Baker case law than with
the Court's subsequent PQ decisions. An extravagant PQ decision
like Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, which
held equal-protection and due-process (not just Guaranty Clause)
challenges to the form of state government to be nonjusticiable,213 is
much more in keeping with the prudentialist spirit of
Baker's secondary factors than the Court's nearly perfect record of
denying PQ claims in the forty years since Baker. In only two cases
during this period-Nixon and Gilligan v. Morgan2t4-has the
Court found a PQ, and in both cases the straight constitutional ar-
gument for deference that we have sketched seems quite plausible.
21 Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
212 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Justice Brennan observed in Baker, "Deciding whether a
matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government.., is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a re-
sponsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." Id. at 211; see
also Powell, 395 U.S. at 518-48 (examining Article I, § 5 for a textual commitment to
a coordinate political branch). Also note that the Court in Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228,
emphasizes the first two Baker factors.
2 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
21'4 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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The same argument also seems strong in some of the most famous
pre-Baker cases, such as Luther v. Borden and Coleman v. Miller.215
Is the difference between our view of PQ and Bickel's-between
the full enforcement and underenforcement accounts-more than
semantic? We think so, for reasons already suggested. The Bicke-
lian account allows "institutional" or other prudential considera-
tions to prompt a court to rule against some constitutional claimant
even if the considerations do not figure in the best interpretation of
the constitutional provision raised; our account does not, at least
where the provision is an existence condition.2 '
Again imagine a district court instructed by Congress to adjudi-
cate claims arising under federal statutes. Smith sues under the
"Safe Workplaces Act." Assume now that the Act did pass Con-
gress and receive the President's signature as a result of wide-
spread outrage over a series of grisly workplace accidents. Acme
concedes that the Act satisfies bicameralism and presentment, but
argues that it is no law because it exceeds the Commerce Clause
(the act applies to all workplaces, say). Smith replies that Acme's
defense constitutes a political question because of various "institu-
tional" considerations: (1) invalidating the act would weaken the
court's legitimacy;17 (2) invalidation would be undemocratic;21' and
(3) a systematic judicial practice of second-guessing Congress on
Commerce Clause issues would be expensive and on balance unjusti-
fied, given that the federal structure of Congress ensures that nearly all
statutes fall within the Clause. The Bickelian would allow the first two
2. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
2 6Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 244-73
(2002) (distinguishing between classical and prudential views of the political question
doctrine).
"', Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (reaffirming the cen-
tral holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1979), and arguing that to do otherwise
"would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to
function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law").
2,8 For a discussion of democratic values as a type of "institutional" consideration
arguably warranting underenforcement, see Adler, Judicial Restraint, supra note 45,
at 785-806.
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considerations, and perhaps the third,"9 to influence the court's ruling
on Acme's defense.
On the one hand, if Article I, Section 8 is an application condi-
tion, and if courts have broad powers to determine the reviewabil-
ity of various sorts of claims (including constitutional claims),220
then we would also countenance a judicial ruling against Acme
based on the various "institutional" considerations just described.
On the other hand, if the Commerce Clause sets forth an existence
condition for federal statutes and other federal law-as we believe
it does-then these considerations legitimately bear on the court's
decision only if they relate to the merits of Acme's defense-only if
they figure in the best interpretation of Article I, Section 8. This is
plausible only on an interpretive theory that gives substantial
weight to nontextual sources. Consider these possible readings of
the Commerce Clause:
(Nonperspectival): Congress may regulate any activities that are
literally interstate or that are closely linked to interstate activi-
ties, for instance, by falling in the stream of commerce.
(Nonperspectival): Congress may regulate any activities where
regulation is justified by federalism failures.
(Perspectival): A law satisfies the Commerce Clause, from Con-
gress's perspective, if it is justified by federalism failures. A law
satisfies the Commerce Clause, from the Court's perspective, if
Congress had a rational basis for finding a federalism failure.
The systematic costs and benefits of judicial inquiry into federalism
failures, as well as perhaps legitimacy and democratic costs, might
warrant the third, perspectival interpretation of the Commerce
Clause-despite the lack of direct textual grounding for that read-
ing-on an appropriate interpretive theory. Perhaps the Framers,
motivated by institutional considerations, intended Congress's Ar-
ticle I, Section 8 determinations to be authoritative for the courts.
219 We say the Bickelian would only possibly allow the third consideration because it
is systematic rather than case-specific, as most of Bickel's own examples were. See
Bickel, supra note 2, at 183-98.
2.0 Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 607-09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
various judicially created doctrines giving rise to nonjusticiability).
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Or perhaps those considerations are interpretive considerations
just by virtue of their moral weight and the presence of some inde-
terminacy in the language of the Clause. In any event, the judge
ought not take account of these factors if she views them as merely
prudential. Judicial power to determine reviewability is no longer
in play, because the constitutional issue here is inseparable from
the merits of a nonstatutory claim that the judge must (by assump-
tion) review-the plaintiff's claim under a statute whose existence
he asserts and the defendant denies. The systematic-cost, democ-
racy, and legitimacy factors must, in the judge's view, have an "in-
ternal" role in fleshing out the meaning of the Commerce Clause,
and once she takes them as having that role, she no longer sees her-
self as underenforcing the Clause.
Note finally that (1) any interpretive theory which internalizes a
wide range of institutional factors and/or produces a large set of
perspectival norms will be highly controversial, and (2) although a
view of adjudication that gives federal courts broad powers to de-
termine reviewability will also be controversial, the controversy
will be quite different. One might be a nontextualist about consti-
tutional interpretation yet believe that courts are obliged to adjudi-
cate all constitutional claims or, conversely (like Justice Scalia in
Webster v. Doe21), a textualist who sees courts as having a common
law power to determine reviewability (even of constitutional
claims) absent an explicit statutory constraint.222
In any event, PQ, like EB, is consistent with our claim that exis-
tence conditions are fully enforced. While EB is best seen as an ex-
istence condition whose enforcement warrants epistemic deference
by courts to nonjudicial actors, PQ is best understood as turning on
the perspectival nature of certain constitutional commands. We
also think that our account of PQ does a generally better job of ex-
plaining the modern cases than the leading alternatives. Finally,
our view of PQ is genuinely distinct from the underenforcement
view: on our view, the various costs of constitutional litigation le-
gitimately trigger the political question doctrine, with respect to a
constitutional provision stating an existence condition only if those
221 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222 See id. at 608-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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costs have an "internal" role in determining the correct interpreta-
tion of that provision.
C. Rational Basis Review
Professor Lawrence Sager, in his seminal article on the underen-
forcement of constitutional norms, suggests that the rational basis
strand of equal protection and substantive due process, as well as
the Takings Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, are
"likely candidates" for characterization as underenforced.223 Profes-
sor Paul Brest, in an equally famous early piece, proposes that de-
scription for the rational basis doctrines, unconstitutional motive
doctrines, and the dormant commerce clause."'
Our general strategy for defusing these putative examples of un-
derenforcement or nonenforcement should already be clear:
Unless a certain contentious view of the Court's power to adopt
doctrines deviating from its best reading of the Constitution is held,
these doctrines are perhaps partly justifiable on epistemic grounds,
but otherwise only if they mirror the content of the underlying con-
stitutional provisions (content that might be "perspectival" in
structure). Rather than belabor the point, we focus here on the ra-
tional basis doctrines.
Consider first the equal protection guaranty. A law that does not
discriminate against a suspect class or otherwise trigger heightened
scrutiny satisfies equal protection if it "rationally furthers a legiti-
mate state purpose or interest."25 Is the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment an existence condition for federal
law? And is the Equal Protection Clause2.6 itself an existence con-
dition for state law? We answer both questions in the affirmative,
for reasons elaborated in Part II. Thus, equal protection cannot-
pace Sager, Brest and others-be underenforced. Indeed, a mo-
ment's reflection on the rational basis test makes the underen-
forcement claim quite puzzling. What is the constitutional norm
such that (1) a law lacking a rational relation to a legitimate gov-
223 Sager, supra note 183, at 1219-20.
2 24 Brest, supra note 183, at 588-601.
225 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (citing
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)).
226 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. § 1.
1188 [Vol. 89:1105
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1187 20032
Constitutional Existence
ernmental end represents a clear or central violation of that norm,
but (2) other laws, albeit rationally supportable, also violate the
norm? Is it the norm of justifiability, or instrumental (means-end)
justifiability? Can it really be said that any law that is not instru-
mentally justifiable-that does not really advance some non-trivial,
appropriately public goal-violates the Constitution's equality
guaranty? This is an implausibly broad reading of equality in the
substantive sense-what Professor Dworkin calls "equal treat-
ment"- and has no immediately apparent connection to equality
in the procedural or expressive sense, "equal respect and con-
cern."
227
Constitutional equal treatment, broadly read, mandates equal
welfare (or equal resources), modulo considerations of individual
responsibility. 21 Constitutional equal treatment, more narrowly
read, is an anticaste principle-a principle proscribing laws that
produce or maintain the subordination of socially salient groups.222
Both norms are plausibly "perspectival," at least in part. Given the
difficulty in determining what promotes long-term equality of re-
sources or welfare, or what effectively undermines rather than en-
trenches a system of racial or gender castes, perhaps legislative de-
terminations on these matters (within some range) should be
binding on the courts.23' But it is hard to see why the rational basis
test should serve to delimit that range. Irrational laws that redis-
tribute wealth, welfare, or status from an arbitrary subset of the
wealthy to an arbitrary subset of the poor or middle-class, or from
an arbitrary subset of the higher castes to an arbitrary subset of the
lower castes, serve to advance substantive equality (albeit in a hap-
hazard way). So on the substantive views of equality just men-
tioned, broader or narrower, the "rational basis" component of
equal protection is a legal fiction. On these views, courts should not
27 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 49, at 227 (discussing the "equal
treatment" versus "equal respect and concern" construals of equality).
'2'See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,
in The Quality of Life 9, 9-10 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (discuss-
ing equal welfare as a social ideal).
29 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2411-
13 1994).
2 Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 137-41 (1993); Adler, Judicial Re-
straint, supra note 45, at 888 ("But even those scholars who advocate welfare rights
most strongly seem to doubt whether such rights should be fully justiciable.").
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strike down merely irrational laws (and indeed almost never do so)
because such laws, without more, are fully consistent with the
constitutional equality guaranty
If equality is understood "expressively," then once more the ra-
tional basis test is a legal fiction, a polite but misleading way of
producing judicial denials of constitutional claims in an area where
truly there is no constitutional constraint at all. On the expressive
view, a law that "expresses" the inferiority of some group-
expresses in the strict linguistic sense or in the broader "social
meaning" sense-is unconstitutional. 3' Presumably, courts should
fully enforce this norm. Even if they should not, it is difficult to see
how the rational basis test "underenforces" a constraint on inap-
propriate meanings. Irrationality (without more) merely "ex-
presses" interest-group politics, garden variety public-choice pa-
thologies, not reprehensible claims about the inferiority of women,
blacks, gays, or other historically oppressed groups.32
3' See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1370-71 (2000) (describing the expressivist view of equal protec-
tion).
232 The disconnect between irrationality as such and reprehensible animosity can be
seen in the Court's cases that nominally fail to apply heightened scrutiny but never-
theless invalidate laws based on prejudice or hatred. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado constitutional amendment that could only be
explained by animus toward homosexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that a permit requirement for a group home
was invalid because it "appear[ed] to [the Court] to rest on an irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded"); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (striking down a food stamp eligibility provision because "a bare congressional
desire to harm [hippies] cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest"). Justice
O'Connor recently characterized these cases as standing for the proposition that
"[w]hen a law exhibits... a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, [the Court]
applie[s] a more searching form of rational basis review." Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). We do not take a view as to whether
the cases sustaining equal protection challenges without formally applying heightened
scrutiny are best characterized as employing such covert heightened scrutiny rather
than a freestanding principle barring government action rooted in hatred. See
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 297,
357 (1997) (describing the "strong anti-caste principle recognized in Moreno, Cle-
burne, and Romer"); cf. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000)
(holding that allegation of arbitrary or irrational discrimination against a "class of
one" states a rational basis claim under the Equal Protection Clause without deciding
whether proof of "subjective ill will" by the government decisionmaker would be nec-
essary for plaintiff to prevail). We simply note that in the cases finding equal protec-
tion violations without nominally applying heightened scrutiny, the constitutional flaw
1190 [Vol. 89:1105
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Finally, proceduralists view equality as constraining the motiva-
tions of legislators or other governmental actors. For example, Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein suggests that legislators must be appropriately
public-regarding,233 while Professor John Hart Ely suggests that
they must not be motivated by racial animus or other sorts of
prejudice.2 3 ' Narrower conceptions of the illegal motivation (like
Professor Ely's) call into question the rational basis test. How does
irrationality, as such, evidence racial prejudice? Broader concep-
tions of the illegal motivation (like Professor Sunstein's) are only
tenuously linked to the concept of equality.
Perhaps one can draw a link instead to due process: Fifth
Amendment equality is strictly a matter of due process, and Four-
teenth Amendment equality is at least textually proximate to due
process. Further, an objectively irrational law does evidence sub-
jectively arbitrary motivations. The interesting question for the
Sunsteinian is why direct judicial inquiry into legislative motiva-
tion 23 (where the claim is simply lack of public-spiritedness, not ra-
cial animus) should be precluded. One answer is as follows: The
systematic costs of allowing such an inquiry would be quite high,
and in most cases objective irrationality tracks subjective arbitrari-
ness. This argument is persuasive, for us, only if litigation costs are
relevant to the meaning of the equal protection guaranty-only if
the guaranty is interpreted in "perspectival" fashion in the follow-
ing manner: (1) The equal protection guaranty, for legislators,
means that they ought to consider only sufficiently public consid-
erations in deliberating about proposed laws, and (2) because it is
costless for legislators to police their own motivations, but costly
for courts to do so, the constitutional value of ensuring public-
spiritedness, for courts, translates into an objective rational basis
identified by the Court is not a failure of instrumental justifiability as required by the
conventional formulation of the rational basis test.
... Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1689, 1689 (1984) (describing naked preferences violative of equal protection and
other doctrines as "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather
than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political
power to obtain what they want").
234 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 137
(1980).
235 Cf. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971.) (contem-
plating judicial inquiry into agency official's subjective reasons for challenged deci-
sion).
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test. On this view, rational basis review is not a legal fiction, but the
full content of a real constitutional constraint addressed to courts.
Note, however, that if the constitutional term "equal protection"
means procedural equality-not procedural equality as tempered
by cost considerations-then this procedural, perspectival defense
of the rational basis test must fail.
To sum up, the equal protection rational basis test would be a
real case of underenforcement if the Equal Protection Clause re-
quired statutes to be means-end justifiable in light of a broad (but
not universal) category of public ends and if the test were a device
for invalidating the clearest cases of means-ends failure. Because
the equal protection guaranty operates in many contexts as an exis-
tence condition, and because the guaranty in any event does not
readily map onto instrumental justifiability-but instead onto
equal treatment or equal concern and respect-the better view is
either that the test demarcates an area free of constitutional con-
straint or that it represents a constitutional mandate that the judi-
cially cognizable evidence for motivational failures violating pro-
cedural equality be objective rather than subjective.
Perhaps shifting from equal protection to substantive due proc-
ess offers new ways to conceptualize the rational basis test. Generic
justifiability seems more relevant to substantive due process than
to equality. Consider that the liberties triggering due process scru-
tiny are not absolute, but rather defeasible by sufficiently weighty
countervailing goals. Imagine, in other words, that the real content
of substantive due process is to invalidate a law (or the application
of a law) that infringes protected liberties, unless the infringement
is closely tailored to an important governmental interest.236 In those
circumstances in which the substantive due process norm functions
as an application condition rather than an existence condition-as
it might function if focused on the justifiability of applications of
challenged laws, not on the laws' overall scope-the rational basis
component of substantive due process could be an example of
genuine underenforcement. The state sanctions P's protected lib-
... Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment 'forbids the government to infringe... "fundamental" liberty interests at all, no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest."' (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)));
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
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erty; P defends on due process grounds; P's sanction is truly uncon-
stitutional if not tailored to an important interest; a court (recog-
nizing the institutional and legitimacy costs of more intrusive re-
view) strikes down the sanction only if patently irrational.
A reformulated version of this story might be offered for the
case of existence conditions. Suppose that a law infringing (some or
many) instances of a protected liberty is void-no law at all-if not
closely related to an important governmental interest. The litiga-
tion costs, error costs, and uncertainty costs of full judicial applica-
tion of this existence condition would be high. Arguably, the public
interest in minimizing such costs is itself an important goal that
would come into play under the Due Process Clause to limit the
scope of judicially cognizable violations. A law infringing a pro-
tected liberty is not, all things considered, unconstitutional from a
judicial point of view unless the systemic costs of a judicial practice
of reviewing laws of this type are sufficiently low (in other words,
unless the law is patently irrational).
The interpretive puzzle here is to explain why this would be the
best reading of due process for some but not all protected liber-
ties-for economic liberties but not privacy. Is it not more straight-
forward to say that economic liberties are just not constitutionally
protected?23 On that account of substantive due process, as with
the substantive and expressive construals of equal protection, the
rational basis test represents neither real underenforcement nor a
constitutionally mandated deference to the legislative branches (A
la our construal of the "political question" doctrine), but rather
mere judicial verbiage marking a constitutional vacuum.
D. The Court as Constitutional Legislator
Throughout the preceding Sections, we have placed to one side
the possibility of viewing the Court as a constitutional legislator-
empowered, to some extent, to issue general doctrinal rules that
bind lower courts and that do not perfectly match underlying
norms. If the Court does not have this power, then "institutional"
considerations legitimately influence adjudication of constitutional
2.7 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("We have returned to the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and eco-
nomic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.").
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existence norms only if these considerations (partly) determine the
content of those norms. For many norms, demonstrating that insti-
tutional concerns play this internal role will mean adopting a prob-
lematic, or at least controversial (qua nontextual) view of constitu-
tional interpretation. But if the Court is a constitutional legislator,
then by hypothesis certain factors-perhaps including litigation
costs, judicial legitimacy, error rates, and the like-can drive a
wedge between constitutional norms and constitutional doctrines. 8
To be sure, this strategy for incorporating "institutional" factors
within doctrine trades controversy about interpretive methodology
for a highly controversial view of the Court's role. Note that the
view being mooted here is not entailed by judicial supremacy. The
judicial supremacist insists that Supreme Court doctrine is binding
on all other actors, lower courts as well as nonjudicial actors.239 But
the supremacist might also insist that the Court is most fundamen-
tally an adjudicative body that must focus on the case at hand, and
issue holdings that represent (the Court's best reading of) applica-
ble constitutional norms. What is on the table, in short, is a radical
variant of judicial supremacy-one that subordinates the Court's
adjudicative role to its function as the enactor of rules guiding the
lower courts. On this view, just as ordinary laws are legitimately
overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to the substantive
goals animating them, so, too, constitutional doctrine is legiti-
mately overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to constitu-
tional norms.
2" See Schauer, supra note 17 (discussing how rules are inevitably both under- and
overinclusive relative to underlying justifications).
23 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and th[is] principle has... been re-
spected [since Marbury] by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispen-
sable feature of our constitutional system."); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 Const. Comment. 455 (2000); Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997). For different views, see, for example, Robert A. Burt, The
Constitution in Conflict 353-75 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review,
40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905 (1990); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000
Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001); Edwin Meese 1II, The
Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 (1987); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall In-
terpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 Rev. Pol. 401
(1986); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994).
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Crucial to the elaboration of this view will be some limitation on
the range of factors that legitimately prompt the Court to adopt
overinclusive or underinclusive doctrines. Consider once again the
enrolled bill doctrine ("EB") and Field. The Court in Field seem-
ingly viewed itself as constitutional legislator and believed all of
the following: (1) a text must be approved by a majority of (a quo-
rum of) each house to satisfy the bicameralism norm set forth in
Article I, Section 7; (2) the net costs of instructing the lower courts
to apply the bicameralism norm directly would be quite high, as
compared to instructing the lower courts to follow EB;2 '0 and there-
fore (3) constitutional doctrine should mandate EB as the test for
bicameralism. The trick here is explaining which factors legiti-
mately enter the cost-benefit calculus performed at step (2).
Surely this calculus cannot be a straight moral balancing. If it
were, the Court could adopt any doctrine it took to be morally jus-
tified on balance. Imagine, for example, the Court choosing be-
tween three options: directly incorporating the bicameralism norm
into doctrine, adopting EB instead, or adopting a rule that statutes
must satisfy EB and must be accompanied by a "statutory impact
analysis" (vetted by the Congressional Budget Office) showing the
statute to have net benefits.241 If all morally relevant considerations
legitimately enter into the Court's formulation of constitutional
doctrine, then the Court-believing this final doctrinal option to be
best supported by welfarist considerations, and not undermined by
others-would be legally warranted in adopting it.
In short, the constitutional-legislator view presupposes that there
are a range of constitutional "values"-not identical to the full
panoply of moral factors-that the Court should consider in craft-
ing doctrinal rules.4 2 Evaluating this view is a large task, one we do
24 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 673 (1892) ("The evils [of EB] would
be far less than those that would certainly result from [permitting lower courts to look
to journals].").
24' Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (requiring that executive agen-
cies' rules satisfy a cost-benefit test where statutorily permissible, and that agencies
prepare formal cost-benefit analyses of economically significant rules for review by
the Office of Management and Budget), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3
C.F.R. 204 (2002).
242 Consider one such value: The Constitution should not be interpreted to bring
upon a catastrophe. That value may well have been at work in the Canadian Supreme
Court's decision in In re a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain
language rights under Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and Section 133 of the
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not attempt to pursue here. On the one hand, the view remains
strikingly at odds with received understandings of the Court. On
the other hand, the view may fit better with actual practice than
traditional accounts-given the abundance of formulaic, doctrinal
tests announced by the Court that seem to track the content of the
norms they purport to "interpret" quite imperfectly."3 Even on this
revisionist view, however, "institutional" considerations justify the
adoption of overinclusive or underinclusive doctrines only if these
considerations themselves have some sort of constitutional status.
That is what we have tried to show by arguing that-whatever the
legitimate process of doctrinal elaboration by the Supreme
Court-that process is not the same as an open-ended moral bal-
ancing.
Consider once more the Field Court's choice between announc-
ing the bicameralism norm as doctrine (thus enabling lower courts
to look outside the enrolled bill for evidence of what Congress
really passed) and EB. One factor seemingly weighing in favor of
EB is the cost of litigation. A world with the bicameralism norm as
Constitution Act, 1867, [1985] S.C.R. 721. A provision of the Canadian Constitution
Act required provincial legislation to be enacted and published in both English and
French, but Manitoba's laws were in English alone. The Canadian Supreme Court
might have treated the constitutional requirement of bilingualism as an application
condition-a guaranty of fair notice to both Francophone and Anglophone citizens.
Had the court so treated the provision, it could have chosen not to enforce it. Instead,
the court appeared to treat the requirement as an existence condition, see id. at 740
(rejecting, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, any "distinction between
statutory provisions that are mandatory in the sense that failure to comply with them
will lead to invalidity of the act in question, and directory, in the sense that failure to
comply will not necessarily lead to such invalidity"). The court nevertheless "under-
enforced" the apparent existence condition by leaving Manitoba's existing laws in
place for such time as reasonably necessary for them to be translated, re-enacted,
printed, and published. See id. at 766-67. Although the case arose in the context of a
suit to invalidate all of Manitoba's laws, we can imagine that the issue might have
been raised as a defense in ordinary litigation. If so, would our view that existence
conditions are necessarily enforced have required the Canadian courts to treat Mani-
toba law as void? We think not-on the assumption that the Canadian Supreme
Court functions as a constitutional legislator. Exercising that function, the court might
well have added to the bilingual enactment and promulgation requirements a caveat
that the provision would not apply retrospectively to cause a catastrophe. Indeed, that
appears to be exactly what the court, in effect, did. We are grateful to Les Green and
Jeremy Webber for urging us to consider this case.
243 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Imple-
menting the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1997); Robert F. Nagel, The Formu-
laic Constitution, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 165 (1985).
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doctrine has higher litigation costs than a world with EB. But does
this amount to a constitutional factor properly influencing the
Court's comparison of the two outcomes? And what about popular
uncertainty costs or the costs expended by legislators fabricating
and resisting fabrication of the Congressional Record? How are
these different from straight welfare considerations, which (as we
have argued) cannot, without more, shape the Supreme Court's
choice between EB and the alternatives? We do not raise these is-
sues to gainsay the powerful moral reasons in favor of EB and
similar bright-line doctrines but to question whether-even on the
view of the Court as constitutional legislator-many of these fac-
tors ought to affect the content of constitutional doctrine.
E. Congressional Control
On the standard reading of Article III, Congress can limit fed-
eral court jurisdiction, at least with respect to nonconstitutional
law. On the standard reading of Article I, Congress can provide for
novel types of federal law-for example, administrative rules-if
nondelegation, separation-of-powers, and enumerated-powers con-
straints are satisfied. These powers, together, imply that Congress
has some power to limit judicial "enforcement" of constitutional
existence conditions. Imagine that Congress instructs the courts to
hear claims and defenses arising under laws of type A, where the
existence conditions for A-type laws are {E, E2,. .. EJ, and that
Congress orders courts to refrain from "enforcing" existence con-
dition E,. Can Congress do this? First, Congress is empowered to
preclude the federal courts from hearing A-type claims or defenses.
Second, depending on the content of JE,... E,-,, Congress might
well be empowered to create a novel type of federal law-call it B-
type law-for which these are the complete existence conditions. If
so, then Congress's instruction that courts not enforce one condi-
tion for A-type law is equivalent to a legitimate instruction that
courts not hear A-type claims or defenses and that they hear B-
type claims and defenses.
An example may be helpful: Congress could mandate that courts
apply EB in cases where it also ensured that enrolled bills met the
constitutional existence conditions for valid substatutory law. The
following provision might be inserted into the Judiciary Act:
2003] 1197
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1196 20032
1198 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1105
The federal courts shall hear claims and defenses arising under
an enrolled bill signed by the President, without reference to ex-
trinsic evidence that the bill may not have passed both houses in
compliance with the Bicameralism Clause, if the President has
determined that the bill is necessary in the interests of workplace
safety.
This justiciability provision is roughly equivalent to a statute em-
powering the President to issue workplace safety rules:
Presidential Safety Rules
(1) The Speaker of the House and the Senate President, if they
agree on a proposed workplace safety rule, shall forward the
proposal to the President.
(2) The President may approve the proposal, if he determines
that is necessary in the interests of workplace safety.
(3) The federal district courts shall have jurisdiction to hear
claims and defenses arising under workplace safety rules.
Such workplace safety rules do not satisfy the Article I, Section 7
existence condition for statutes, but they do satisfy all conditions
for administrative rules: The nondelegation condition (the "work-
place-safety" goal in the Act provides an "intelligible principle,
2
1
sufficient to satisfy Article I, Section 1), separation-of-powers con-
straints (the role of the Speaker of the House and Senate President
is sufficiently preliminary to satisfy Chadha and similar cases 25),
and others (particular rules failing to satisfy enumerated powers
and Bill of Rights conditions will be voided by the courts).
Crucial to this example is that the existence condition Congress
has rendered nonjusticiable-the Bicameralism Clause-is not an
existence condition for all federal law. If Congress, instead, had in-
structed the courts to hear claims and defenses arising under work-
244 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-20 (1935); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
.4S See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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place safety rules without reference to whether the rules had any
connection to interstate commerce, that would have been unconsti-
tutional. Note that Article I, Section 8 is an existence condition
(unwaivable by Congress) for all federal law, or at least all federal
positive law; that nonjudicial federal actors cannot create state law;
and that therefore courts must treat purported federal administra-
tive rules, purported presidential orders, or other purported fed-
eral positive law that exceeds the bounds of Article I, Section 8
(and all other sources of congressional authority, such as Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment) as no law, notwithstanding a con-
gressional mandate to the contrary.
Our view, in short, is that Congress possesses the power to spec-
ify the types of nonconstitutional law adjudicated by federal courts,
but lacks any additional power to waive judicial enforcement of ex-
istence conditions. Where the putative "waiver" is equivalent to an
instruction changing the types of nonconstitutional law the courts
are authorized to adjudicate, Congress has acted permissibly given
its Article III power to limit federal court jurisdiction. By contrast,
a true congressional waiver would require courts to recognize some
proposition as law even though that proposition does not satisfy
the constitutional existence conditions for any kind of law. Con-
gress cannot require or authorize the courts to do that.
Intuitions about particular cases provide one reason for believ-
ing that Congress lacks a general power to waive judicial enforce-
ment of existence conditions. Imagine that Congress, in response to
Chadha, tries to resuscitate the two-house legislative veto by waiv-
ing judicial enforcement of the constitutional presentment re-
quirement with respect to a particular category of concurrent con-
gressional resolutions. Intuitively, it seems that Congress cannot
circumvent Chadha in this way. The same would hold true for a
parallel waiver of judicial enforcement of bicameralism in response
to Clinton v. New York-which demonstrates that the impermissi-
bility of congressional waiver of existence conditions is not limited
to cases of congressional aggrandizement.
A deeper argument is that a genuine congressional power to
waive judicial enforcement of constitutional existence conditions is
in tension with the fact that these conditions are addressed to
11992003]
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judges 246 as well as other actors. The Constitution specifies, for
judges and others, part of what it takes for a proposition to be a
given type of federal or state law. If that were not the case-if exis-
tence conditions for judicial purposes were wholly extraconstitu-
tional-then courts would never look to the Constitution in deter-
mining what law is, even to the extent of distinguishing between
real governmental officials and impostors, or between real statutes
and extralegislative scribblings. A legal regime in which a constitu-
tion exists and states existence conditions, yet addresses these con-
ditions solely to nonjudicial actors, is a conceivable regime-but it
is not the American regime. To be sure, as we have repeatedly ac-
knowledged, existence conditions under the Constitution are some-
times perspectival. The Constitution might be read as instructing
courts that a proposition is an A-type law if it satisfies conditions
E,,.. . E.), where in turn E, makes reference to congressional de-
246 Here it is worth recalling that even the champions of robust congressional power
to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts do not say that Congress can make it-
self the final arbiter of any constitutional question that would otherwise arise in the
course of litigation. Thus, Professor Henry Hart's famous dialogue concludes that,
even if Congress can strip the federal courts of the power to adjudicate an otherwise
justiciable federal constitutional issue, state courts must nonetheless have that power.
See Hart, supra note 185, at 1401. Professor Hart's argument, like Chief Justice Mar-
shall's in Marbury, runs through the Supremacy Clause, and thus would apply to ap-
plication as well as existence conditions. The argument we present in the text is both
less and more far-reaching. It is less far-reaching in that it would only bar Congress
from waiving judicial enforcement of existence conditions, but more far-reaching in
that where it does bar such a congressional waiver, it would require that the federal
court itself decide whether the relevant existence condition is satisfied; congression-
ally mandated deference to, say, a state court determination of whether an existence
condition were satisfied would only be permissible if the federal court thought, on
epistemic or other grounds, that such double deference (first to Congress and then to
the designated state court) would lead to the best understanding of the existence con-
dition in question. Of course, our view is not especially far-reaching, falling, as it does,
within the mainstream of views about the limits of congressional ability to direct judi-
cial decisions by federal courts. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Ar-
ticle III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 206-09
(1985) (concluding that some federal court must be able to hear cases arising under
federal law); Hart, supra note 185, at 1402 ("[J]urisdiction always is jurisdiction only
to decide constitutionally."); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zon-
ing Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129
(1981) (arguing generally that congressional efforts to strip the federal courts of juris-
diction to resolve claims arising under particular constitutional doctrines violate such
doctrines). For a useful summary of the case law and secondary literature on jurisdic-
tion-stripping, see Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availabil-
ity and Scope of Review, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1551 (2001).
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terminations. Yet this perspectival character is a contingent feature
of existence conditions, one that obtains only if the relevant text is
sufficiently open-ended to admit a perspectival reading, other
sources of constitutional interpretation support that reading, and
so on. A genuine congressional power to waive judicial enforce-
ment of existence conditions would make all conditions perspecti-
val: It would mean that, for judicial purposes, all conditions are sat-
isfied if Congress has so determined. We can find nothing in
Article III, or any other part of the Constitution, that warrants a
wholesale judicial deference to Congress as to what counts, consti-
tutionally speaking, as law.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice John Marshall argued in Marbury that the Consti-
tution's status as higher law, combined with the judicial branch's
obligation to say what the law is, conferred upon the courts a
power and obligation to set aside laws inconsistent with the Consti-
tution. Marshall's argument has long been criticized as question-
begging: Why should the courts assume that they are better posi-
tioned to interpret the Constitution than other actors, especially
Congress?
We have argued here that the judiciary's power to say what the
law is does indeed entail the power and duty to set aside unconsti-
tutional laws, but for a different, and in some sense a more modest,
set of reasons than those offered by Marshall. Courts are fre-
quently called upon to apply nonconstitutional law such as statutes.
One can imagine a legal system in which the constitution plays no
role in identifying what propositions have the status of nonconsti-
tutional law, but in the actual U.S. legal system, many of the exis-
tence conditions for nonconstitutional law are contained in the
Constitution. Moreover, many of the most familiar constitutional
provisions and doctrines-including separation-of-powers, most
federalism, and many individual rights provisions and doctrines-
set forth existence conditions. Accordingly, the courts' obligation
to apply nonconstitutional law entails an obligation to "enforce"
the Constitution. Even if Marshall's argument is disregarded, the
Constitution simply cannot be taken away from the courts.
Our argument is largely consistent with doctrines-such as the
enrolled bill doctrine, the political question doctrine, and rational
20031 1201
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basis review-that appear to grant Congress (or other actors) com-
plete or partial deference with respect to the proper interpretation
of existence conditions. In some of these cases, the best judicial in-
terpretation of the relevant existence condition gives Congress (or
some other actor) deference on epistemic grounds. In others, the
relevant existence condition may be "perspectival," addressing one
command to Congress (or some other actor) and another to the
courts.
Consistency with existing doctrine is not, of course, the whole
story. To the extent that a proposal to make various parts of the
Constitution nonjusticiable is a proposal for constitutional amend-
ment, it aims to reform existing doctrine. It is crucial to understand
just how sweeping such an amendment would be. A constitutional
amendment precluding enforcement of one or another constitu-
tional existence condition effectively transforms that provision into
an application condition. It thereby changes what counts as law for
purposes of ordinary, nonconstitutional adjudication. For some ex-
istence conditions, an amendment of this sort is imaginable, if per-
haps inadvisable. But a radical amendment precluding the en-
forcement of any constitutional existence conditions (or other
provisions) borders on the incoherent. How could one tell whether
an utterance is a statute, or just the deontic ravings of a lunatic, ex-
cept by reference to Article I, Section 7? Such a radical amend-
ment is conceivable only if packaged with a change in our legal cul-
ture-namely, one in which a sufficient range of existence
conditions for federal law are provided extraconstitutionally. Pro-
ponents of taking the Constitution away from the courts have yet
to grapple with this issue, let alone provide a concrete proposal for
"amending" the U.S. legal culture in the manner required. Formal
constitutional amendments alone would not do the trick . 7
247 We argued in Part II that the question whether a particular constitutional propo-
sition is an existence condition or an application condition is itself a question of con-
stitutional law rather than extraconstitutional law. Why then, wouldn't a simple con-
stitutional amendment be sufficient to convert all existence conditions into
application conditions? The answer is that once the constitutional provisions them-
selves lose their status as existence conditions, in order to fill the legal void, some
other-extraconstitutional-criteria would need to be found through which to iden-
tify the law. By definition, however, extraconstitutional criteria cannot be established
through a constitutional amendment.
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